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Abstract
Essays on the Economic Well-Being of Women
by
Timothy Roeper
Adviser: Professor David Jaeger
This dissertation consists of three chapters:
The Effect of College Distance on Economic Opportunity for Low-Income Youth
This chapter studies the impact of one obstacle to college completion among low-income
youth: geographic distance to the nearest four-year public college. The chapter’s main
results show that cutting the distance to a public four-year college from its mean value of 18
miles to half of that, 9 miles, is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the college
graduation rate of low-income women. Reducing the distance to public community college
also increases the probability of completing college for low-income women. These effects
are robust to controlling for socioeconomic background, environment, and standardized test
scores.
Low-income men, who have much lower college graduation rates than their female coun-
terparts, do not appear to be affected by distance to a public college. Policymakers should
consider this finding when deciding whether to establish new campuses of public college
systems or to consolidate two existing campuses.
v
A Cross-National Study of the Gender Gap in the Economic Consequences of
Divorce: Decomposing the Effects of Custody, Wage Rates, and Tax and Trans-
fer Programs
This chapter estimates the economic consequences of divorce by gender in six different de-
veloped economies. Across all countries studied, women fare worse than men, due to lower
average labor income and a higher likelihood of being responsible for children post-divorce.
For each country we test the impact on the economic consequences of divorce of: (a) equaliz-
ing average wage rates between men and women of similar levels of education, (b) re-assigning
custody of all children to men, and (c) imposing the tax and transfer programs of other coun-
tries on the United States. We find that divorcing women in the United States experience
worse levels of economic well-being on average than men, and that the discrepancy is larger
in the United States than in the other countries we study. The gap between the United States
and other countries is mostly due to differences in tax and transfer policies and fertility rates
prior to divorce.
Maternity Leave for Teen Mothers: The Impact of Short-Run Interruptions in
Schooling
This chapter examines a previously unexplored causal mechanism determining the impact of
teen motherhood on educational outcomes. Specifically, I identify the impact of the short-
term disruption to school attendance induced by child birth and recovery, as opposed to the
ongoing burden of raising a young child. Using administrative data on teen mothers in the
New York City public school system, I exploit exogenous variation in the timing of births
relative to the academic year to identify the impact of a marginal absence on standardized
test scores and the likelihood of successfully graduating.
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Chapter 1




In recent years, some state university systems have chosen to open a new campus, such as the
recently created Merced campus of the University of California, or attempted to save money
and improve quality by consolidating campuses, such as the recent consolidations in the
University of Georgia system.1 Policymakers considering a consolidation of campuses must
weigh a tradeoff between reducing costs to maintain the university system and increasing the
geographic distance that students must travel to access the nearest campus. Conversely, pol-
icymakers considering opening a new campus must consider whether the benefits of making
a campus available to a previously underserved region of the state can justify the additional
costs. This paper examines the impact of geographic distance from a four-year public college
1http://www.usg.edu/consolidation/ last accessed June 23rd, 2017
1
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on economic opportunity for the cohort of lower-income youths in the Millennial generation.
Measures of college affordability typically focus on the cost of tuition net of financial
aid, but for low-income families, a college’s proximity can also determine if it is affordable.
Geographic distance can add to the costs of going to college in several ways. If no public
college is within a reasonable commuting distance, students have to move and establish
a residence separate from their families, which can be expensive. If a college is within
commuting distance, then the longer the commute, the less time available for studying or to
potentially work part- or full-time. In addition, the longer the commute the more expensive
it is to travel. Distance can also add to the psychic costs of attending college by separating
students from their communities and support networks. For some students, family ties and
responsibilities could make it implausible to travel very far to attend college. The costs
imposed by distance to a public college will be most salient for low-income students who
cannot expect significant financial support from their parents to attend college. One would
therefore expect the impact of public college distance to be largest for students from low-
income backgrounds.
Despite large increases in the last few decades in the number of students enrolling in
college, there remain significant inequalities in the likelihood of successfully earning a Bach-
elors degree across youths from different economic backgrounds (Bailey and Dynarski, 2011).
Conditional on enrolling in a four-year college, lower-income youths are less likely to suc-
cessfully finish, leading to large inequalities in the probability of completing a college degree
overall. Addressing this inequality by improving the likelihood of success for lower income
youths could potentially reap large social benefits. Brand and Xie (2010) find that the impact
of completing college on wages is greatest for students whose socioeconomic characteristics
suggest they are the least likely to complete it. Evidence suggests that college education
not only raises incomes, but also improves health behaviors (Currie and Moretti, 2003) and
civic participation (Dee, 2004). Zimmerman (2014) uses a sharp GPA cutoff for access to
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Florida’s four-year public colleges to demonstrate that access to a four-year college has large
economic benefits, even for students whose prior academic achievement puts them on the
margin of being accepted to a four-year college.
Card (1993) shows that young men in the Baby Boomer generation who grew up in a
labor market with a public four-year college were more likely to attend college, and had
higher incomes as adults. There are two key reasons why a re-examination of this question
is warranted. One is that public higher education has changed significantly since the Baby
Boom generation attended college. State university systems have expanded, tuition has
risen, student loans have grown in size and prevalence, and the employment options for
people without a college degree have deteriorated. The other reason is that the sample
Card (1993) uses includes only men, and thus he does not examine the impact of college
proximity on women, who have overtaken men in college enrollment and completion since
the cohort Card (1993) studied. An increasingly large percentage of families depend on
women’s earnings, making women’s opportunity to access higher education an important
topic of study.
Currie and Moretti (2003) use public college openings per capita as an instrument to
measure the causal impact of mothers’ college attendance on infant health outcomes, and
Dee (2004) uses distance to a community college as an instrument to measure the impact of
college attendance on civic participation. In both cases, the first stage regressions show that
college proximity is significantly correlated with the likelihood of attending college.
Using German survey data, Spiess and Wrohlich (2010) find that each kilometer of dis-
tance from a public university reduces the probability of attending college by between .2 and
.3 percentage points, while in Canada, Frenette et al. (2004) find that living in commuting
distance of higher education institutions raises the probability of attendance.
To my knowledge, no papers have estimated the impact of college distance on the proba-
bility of completing college and economic opportunity for women specifically. Nor have any
CHAPTER 1. EFFECT OF COLLEGE DISTANCE 4
papers specifically examined the impact of college distance on the cohort born in the United
States in the 1980s. It could potentially be misleading to extrapolate from Card’s results
with male Baby Boomers to Millennial women or men. Millennials face a different higher
education landscape, and prior evidence indicates that higher education interventions can
have differential effects on men and women (Angrist et al., 2009).
Distance and the Demand for College Education
I assume that the demand for college education can be characterized as a function of ability,
cost, and parental income:
Demand for Education = E(A,C, I)
Where, A, is ability or prior scholastic preparation, C is cost, and I is parental income.
Further, I assume the demand for education is increasing with ability and parental income,
decreasing with cost, and that the impact of cost on demand for education decreases with













Completing a college degree has both a financial cost and an opportunity cost. The
financial cost is the money one must spend to attend college and the opportunity cost is
the time spent on college multiplied by one’s potential hourly wage. Distance to a college
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imposes both financial and opportunity costs on students. Commuting costs both money
and time, and if the cost of commuting is too great, one must establish a residence closer to
a college’s campus. Formally, the cost of attending college, C, can be characterized in the
following way:
C(P, S, w,D,R) = P + Sw + min(f(D) + t(D)w,R)
where, P is the price of attending (tuition and fees net of financial aid), S is the time needed
for attending classes and studying, w is the wage rate, D is distance, f(.) is the direct
financial cost of commuting as a function of distance, t(.) is the travel time required for
commuting as a function of distance, and R is the financial cost of establishing a residence
on or immediately adjacent to campus, such that commuting costs are essentially zero. The
cost of commuting in terms of both time and money increases monotonically with distance,
but at a sufficient distance it becomes cheaper simply to establish a new residence, so the
cost imposed by distance is the minimum of f(D) + t(D)w and R. For the students who
live within commuting distance of their college, the cost of attending college is a continuous,









> 0 if f(D) + t(D)w < R
Presumably, college education, E, is a normal good with a downward sloping demand func-











< 0 if f(D) + t(D)w < R (1.5)
The extent of the impact of distance on college education is dependent on students’ cost sen-
sitivity. The larger the absolute value of ∂E/∂C, the more negative ∂E/∂D. I have assumed
CHAPTER 1. EFFECT OF COLLEGE DISTANCE 6
that higher income students are less cost-sensitive than low-income students (Inequality 1.4).
For this reason, one would expect the impact of college distance to be concentrated among




Establishing a new residence is very expensive, and at many public colleges, living in the
dorms can cost as much as or more than tuition. Given the high value of R, one can safely
assume that f(D) + t(D)w < R for most cost sensitive students. A 2012 Sallie Mae survey
found that 51 percent of college students overall and 38 percent of students at four-year
public colleges live at home to save money.2 One can reasonably assume that most of the
students who live away from home do so because they prefer it and can afford it, not because
it is cheaper.
Cost sensitive students are likely to commute, and the cost of commuting is a continuous
function of distance. Despite this, Card (1993) uses a dichotomous measure of geographic
proximity, a dummy variable indicating whether a college is in an individual’s labor market or
not, to estimate the impact of college distance on outcomes. This choice is not theoretically
motivated, but rather due to a simple data limitation. The National Longitudinal Survey, the
data source that Card (1993) uses, contains only a dichotomous measure of college proximity.
More recently, Chetty et al. (2014) use the number of colleges per capita in a commuting
zone to test whether nearby colleges improve economic opportunity and Currie and Moretti
(2003) use the same measure for their study, but this measure is completely disconnected
from the actual costs of attending college. A densely populated area with a lot of colleges
and a sparsely populated area with a few could have the same number of colleges per capita,
but the cost of traveling to a college is likely to be far higher in the sparsely populated area
2https://www.salliemae.com/assets/Core/how-America-pays/HowAmericaPays2012.pdf Table 21 on
page 39 last accessed June 23, 2017
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where distances are greater. The advantage of constructing a measure of college proximity
in terms of continuous distance is that it allows one to estimate its impact in a manner that
is consistent with how it theoretically affects students’ costs.
Data and Methods
Individual Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) tracks the cohort born between
1980 and 1984. The first survey wave begins in 1997, when nearly all the youths are living
in households with their parents or guardians, and a new survey is done with the youths
each year. The most recent available survey year is from 2013, when the cohort is in its late
twenties and early thirties.
For each survey wave that the youths are under 18, I convert their family income to a
percentile based on the observed family incomes in that year. If a 16-year old is observed in
1998, whose family has an income of $44,000, that family income is converted into a percentile
based on the family incomes of other 16-year olds observed in 1998 (68th percentile). Each
youth is then assigned a single parental income percentile based on the average across all
survey waves that they were below age 18.
For each survey wave that the youths were 25 or older and not enrolled in school, I
converted their individual earnings into a percentile based on the earnings of other youths
in that year of the same age. For example, an individual earning $50,000 in 2011 when
they are 29 years old, would be assigned a percentile based on where they fall in the income
distribution of other 29 year olds in 2011 who are not enrolled in school (79th percentile).
This conversion facilitates easy comparisons across years and ages, without worrying about
the impact of recessions, the life cycle, or inflation. Family income percentiles were averaged
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across all waves that a youth was below 18, and the youths’ incomes were averaged across
all waves they were 25 years or older and not enrolled in school.
Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics for the full sample. Table 1.2 shows the sample
used for the main analysis.
College Distance by County
I construct a new county-level measure of geographic proximity to college that is spatially
sensitive. Rather than using a dummy variable indicating if a public four-year college is
present or not, the approach used in Card (1993), or the number of colleges or college
openings per capita (Currie and Moretti (2003) ; Chetty et al. (2014)), I find the population-
weighted average distance to a public four-year college for each county.
I collected the addresses for every four-year public college in the 50 states and Washington
D.C. from the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System from the National Center
for Education Statistics (IPEDS). I geocoded each address using the Google Maps API, and
for colleges that listed a P.O. Box as their address, I used the institution name, city, and
state to identify its latitude and longitude.
Average distance to a college in each county is calculated by dividing counties into their
Census tracts, finding the distance in miles to the closest four-year public college for each
tract, and averaging the tract-level college distances in each county, weighting the tracts by
their population.
The advantage of this approach is immediately apparent when comparing two counties
that do not have any public four-year colleges and therefore have equivalent geographic
proximity to college by all non-spatially sensitive measures. Deer Lodge County in Montana
does not have any public four-year colleges, but it borders Silver Bow County where Montana
Tech of the University of Montana is located, and its average distance to a public four-year
college is only 21 miles. Richland County in Montana does not have any public four-year
CHAPTER 1. EFFECT OF COLLEGE DISTANCE 9














College Distance in Miles
Four−year Public Colleges
●
Note: Black dots indicate four-year public colleges. Deer Lodge County in the southwest of Montana is
relatively close to Montana Tech. Richland County in the northeast is over 200 miles from a four-year public
college, but is nonetheless populous enough to be represented in the NLSY 97 data.
colleges either, but the closest four-year public college is over 200 miles away (see Figure
1.1). The sharp contrast in geographic proximity to a public college between the two counties
can only be captured by a spatially sensitive measure. Both counties have zero colleges per
capita so they would appear equivalent by that measure of college proximity.
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County Characteristics
Counties that are close to four-year public colleges, may be more urban, richer, and better
educated than counties that are not. They might also have a different level of inequality.
These county characteristics may influence economic opportunity even after controlling for
parental income, education, and race. I include county-level population density, inequality
(Gini coefficient), median income of families with children, and percentage of the adult
population with a Bachelors degree as independent variables, to control for the environmental
characteristics that public colleges may be associated with.
County-level data on population density and share of the population with a Bachelors
degree are drawn from the 2000 Census. The county-level inequality and income levels use
the analysis of IRS records from Chetty et al. (2014), which uses tax returns from the 1990s
of families with dependents to produce county level estimates of, among other things, the
median income of families with children and the Gini coefficient.3
3I retrieved the data from http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/data/
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
College Graduate 0.252 0.434 0 1 8954
Enrolled 4-year College 0.451 0.498 0 1 8984
4-year College Distance 18.309 27.243 1.079 241.007 8557
Log(College Distance) 2.464 0.868 0.076 5.485 8557
Community College Distance 8.837 9.120 0.946 86.864 8984
Log(Community College Distance) 1.888 0.695 −0.056 4.464 8984
Population.Density 2327.119 6884.808 4.3 70172.600 8984
Log(Pop. Density) 6.155 1.836 1.459 11.159 8984
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 51.027 28.101 0.074 99.742 6904
Parents’ Income 46438.663 42879.995 −48100 425586 6904
Vocational Apt. Test Score (ASVAB) 45.317 29.174 0 100 7093
Mother’s Highest Grade 12.582 3.601 1 95 8010
Black 0.26 0.439 0 1 8984
Hispanic 0.212 0.408 0 1 8984
Mixed Race 0.009 0.096 0 1 8984
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 27.27 10.093 8.527 70.657 8984
Median Income (County) 59320.298 18092.33 20500 125400 8912
County Inequality (Gini) 0.465 0.112 0.235 1.097 8912
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics: Women in Bottom Half of Income Distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
College Graduate 0.163 0.369 0 1 1661
Enrolled 4-year College 0.353 0.478 0 1 1668
4-year College Distance 19.16 25.147 1.079 241.007 1573
Log(College Distance) 2.521 0.891 0.076 5.485 1573
Community College Distance 9.615 10.553 0.946 86.864 1668
Log(Community College Distance) 1.928 0.748 −0.056 4.464 1668
Population.Density 2135.346 6407.942 4.3 70172.600 1668
Log(Pop. Density) 5.997 1.867 1.459 11.159 1668
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 25.951 14.015 0.082 49.952 1668
Parents’ Income 17595.242 10823.42 −8050 56450 1668
Vocational Apt. Test Score (ASVAB) 35.074 26.544 0 99.655 1309
Mother’s Highest Grade 11.398 2.864 1 20 1454
Black 0.358 0.48 0 1 1668
Hispanic 0.278 0.448 0 1 1668
Mixed Race 0.01 0.097 0 1 1668
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 25.536 9.286 8.675 57.696 1668
Median Income (County) 54723.949 16027.67 20500 109400 1641
County Inequality (Gini) 0.478 0.106 0.236 1.097 1641
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Analysis
Importance of College Distance
I start my analysis by testing whether the relationship between college graduation and dis-
tance, parental income, and ability fits the predictions in Inequalities 1.1, 1.5, and 1.6, by
estimating the following linear probability model:
College Graduate =β0 + β1 log(College Distancei) + β2Parents’ Income Percentile+
β3 log(Distance)× Income Percentile + β4ASVAB Score + ε (1.7)
Where ASVAB Score, Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, is used as a proxy for
ability. Inequality 1.5 predicts that β1 will be negative, Inequality 1.3 predicts that β2 will
be positive, Inequality 1.6 predicts that β3 will be positive, and Inequality 1.1 predicts that
β4 will be positive. The parameter estimates are shown in Table 1.3. The signs of all the co-
efficients are all consistent with my predictions, although not all are statistically significantly
different from zero. As expected, the parental income main effect and ASVAB score have
strong effects on the likelihood of completing a college degree. College distance, also has
an effect on the likelihood of completing a degree, but the effect seems to be much stronger
among women, where it is statistically significantly different from zero, than among men,
where it is not. Among both men and women, the interaction term between parental income
and college distance is positive, consistent with the theoretical prediction that distance will
have a negative effect on low-income youth, but the effect will be smaller in magnitude for
youth from higher income families.
College distance is highly correlated with population density. One possible concern with
the regression in Equation 1.7 is that college distance could simply be a proxy for how ur-
ban a place is and for a variety of reasons that could affect low-income youth’s likelihood
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Table 1.3: Linear Probability Model of College Graduation
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: All Men Women
Log(College Distance) −0.0306** −0.0170 −0.0440**
(0.0137) (0.0160) (0.0188)
Parents’ Income Percentile 0.00175*** 0.00188** 0.00176*
(0.000670) (0.000797) (0.000963)
Log(College Distance)× 0.000279 0.000198 0.000355
Parents’ Income Percentile (0.000265) (0.000313) (0.000382)
ASVAB Score 0.00640*** 0.00581*** 0.00684***
(0.000214) (0.000287) (0.000340)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.0751** −0.123*** −0.0280
(0.0356) (0.0410) (0.0484)
Observations 5,429 2,721 2,708
R-squared 0.258 0.261 0.270
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
of completing college. To address this concern, I re-estimate the regression equation con-
trolling for population density and its interaction with parental income. The results of that
regression are in Table 1.4. The main effect of college distance, remains both statistically
and economically significant for women, and the interaction term is still consistent with the
prediction that the effect would be large for low-income youth, and small or zero for youth
from higher income families. In other words, college distance is not proxying for population
density, even though the two variables are highly correlated.
The interaction between college distance and parental income assumes a linear relation-
ship between income and the effect of distance, but most likely the relationship is non-linear.
Above a certain income level, ability, rather than cost, is probably the binding constraint
that determines on the margin if a youth will graduate from college or not. Therefore, above
that threshold, distance probably does not have any negative effect on the likelihood of col-
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Table 1.4: Linear Probability Model of College Graduation
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: All Men Women
Log(College Distance) −0.0317 −0.00403 −0.0572**
(0.0210) (0.0271) (0.0277)
Parents’ Income Percentile −4.97e-05 6.32e-05 0.000271
(0.00162) (0.00239) (0.00234)
Log(College Distance)× 0.000546 0.000450 0.000582
Parents’ Income Percentile (0.000344) (0.000501) (0.000481)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.000979 0.00773 −0.00864
(0.00923) (0.0123) (0.0128)
Log(Pop. Density)× 0.000186 0.000191 0.000153
Parents’ Income Percentile (0.000156) (0.000216) (0.000231)
ASVAB Score 0.00639*** 0.00580*** 0.00683***
(0.000215) (0.000286) (0.000340)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.0648 −0.198 0.0572
(0.102) (0.134) (0.136)
Observations 5,429 2,721 2,708
R-squared 0.258 0.262 0.270
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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lege graduation the way it could below that income threshold. In order to explore the impact
of distance by income level, I run a series of weighted regressions, in which the weights are
determined by the distance of an observation from a given income percentile, x.
Weight(x) = φ
(




Where φ(.) is the density function of the standard normal distribution. The results of these
regressions for women are shown in Table 1.5, and the results for men are shown in Table
1.6. The results reveal that below roughly the 50th income percentile college distance seems
to matter a lot for women, but above the median it does not. For men, college distance does
not seem to have an effect at any income level. Another interesting difference between men
and women is the effect of ASVAB scores. Predictably, it is a powerful predictor of college
graduation across income levels, but the magnitude of the effect varies considerably across
income levels and sexes. For low-income women, the likelihood of graduating from college
increases by .6% for a marginal point on the ASVAB test (the variable ranges from 0 to 100),
but for low-income men, the marginal effect of an extra point on the ASVAB test is just
.3%. At higher incomes, the effect for men and women is roughly .7%. One interpretation
of these results is that high ability women from low-income families are highly likely to take
advantage of opportunities in higher education if there are affordable options nearby, but
that for some reason high-ability, low-income men are far less likely to.
Table 1.7 divides the data into four subsets based on sex and income-level, which makes
it easier to see the contrasts discussed above. It shows clearly that college distance has a
significant impact for low-income women, but not for any other sub-group. It also shows an
interesting pattern in the effect of parental income on the likelihood of college graduation:
for both men and women, income percentile matters a lot for high-income youths, but not
for low-income youths. It may be that lower-income students are expected to finance their

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 1. EFFECT OF COLLEGE DISTANCE 19
educations alone through the assistance of loans and work-study, but for higher income
students, parents contribute resources to finance their children’s education. If parents’ are
contributing, then the level of parental income matters a lot more than if they are not.
One possible concern with focusing on a seemingly significant effect for a subset of the
data is the multiple comparison problem. Setting an α at .1 or .05 should lead to a rejection
rate of 10% or 5% when the null hypothesis is true, but if one is testing a hypothesis on
four subsets of the data, then the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis on one of the
subsets, even if the null hypothesis is true for all four subsets, is substantially higher than α.
My analysis involves four subsets: low-income women, low-income men, high-income women,
and high-income men, so the fact that one coefficient has a p-value below .1 or .05 in the
expected direction is not necessarily strong evidence that the null hypothesis is false for
any subset of the data. For this reason, I implicitly apply the Bonferroni correction, which
divides α by the number of subsets tested in order to ensure that my finding of statistical
significance is not due to the multiple comparison problem. Rather than starring coefficients
with p-values of .1, .05, and .01, Table 1.7 stars the coefficients with p-values of .025, .0125,
and .0025, such that if the null hypothesis is true for all sub-groups, the probability of
having any coefficient starred twice is below .05. Based on the results in Table 1.7, one can
reject the null hypothesis that college distance has zero effect on any group of students at
an α of .05, and can conclude that for women from low-income families, college distance
reduces the probability that they will acquire a four-year college degree. The remainder of
the paper focuses on the apparent relationship between college distance and likelihood of
college graduation for women whose parents are below the median income level.
Controlling for Omitted Variables
If one allows for a more complex model of the likelihood of college completion that includes
a potential effect due to family expectations or peer influence, there are variables omitted





























































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 1. EFFECT OF COLLEGE DISTANCE 21
from the regressions above that could potentially bias the coefficient on college distance.
One in particular is the effect of having more highly educated parents or living among a
more highly educated or higher income population. More highly educated people live closer
to universities, on average, than less well educated people so that could potentially bias the
estimated effect of college distance. Local inequality, defined by a county-level Gini coeffi-
cient is also correlated with college proximity, even after controlling for population density
and state fixed effects. Areas near colleges do not necessarily have the same demographic
characteristics as places far from colleges, although a lot of that variation is captured by
controlling for population density and state-level fixed effects. If the impact of college dis-
tance on cost is responsible for its negative association with college completion rates, the
coefficient on college distance should remain robust to controlling for all of these previously
omitted variables. Table 1.8 shows results from four other specifications, include a variable
on mother’s highest grade completed, race, percent of the county population that holds a
Bachelors degree, median income, and county level inequality. The impact of college dis-
tance does not vary significantly across specifications, despite differences in control variables
and differences in sample due to missing values for some of the control variables. In fact,
college distance is one of only a handful of variables that do matter. This may be surprising,
but it can be attributed to the strong explanatory power of ASVAB score, which explains a
substantial amount of variation in college outcomes and is highly correlated with parental
income and education. ASVAB score and log of college distance have a correlation coefficient
of .0184, and when one is regressed on the other it produces a t-statistic of .55 and a p-value
of .582. In other words, they are not at all correlated.
Using specification (4) of Table 1.8 as the preferred specification, one can evaluate the
magnitude of the impact of reducing college distance. If the distance of a low-income female
youth to the closest public college were cut in half, say from 20 miles to 10, her likelihood of
graduating from college would increase by approximately four percentage points on average,
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Table 1.8: Impact of College Distance on Likelihood of Graduating College: Low-Income
Women
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(College Distance) −0.0663** −0.0730*** −0.0568* −0.0592**
(0.0221) (0.0212) (0.0227) (0.0225)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.0283** −0.0220+ −0.0210+ −0.0234++
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0118)
ASVAB Score 0.00634*** 0.00619*** 0.00637***
(0.000541) (0.000524) (0.000556)
Parents’ Inc Percentile 0.000383 0.000178 0.000214
(0.000894) (0.000870) (0.000875)






Mixed Race −0.156++ −0.151++
(0.0754) (0.0752)
County Inequality (Gini) −0.0193 −0.0404
(0.241) (0.241)
Median Income (County) −1.95e−06 −1.82e−06
(1.52e−06) (1.53e−06)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.00290 0.00282
(0.00222) (0.00223)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.500*** 0.192 0.221 0.231
(0.115) (0.127) (0.193) (0.191)
Observations 1,566 1,114 1,093 1,093
R-squared 0.053 0.241 0.235 0.237
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++p< .05, +p< .1
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19.4% of the observations in that specification graduated from college.4
In Tables 1.7 and 1.8, I define “low-income” as any respondent whose parents’ income
is below the median. I chose the median as a cutoff based on the results of the weighted
regressions in Table 1.5 and the desire to use a cutoff that is intuitive, but I could have easily
chosen many other cutoffs. It is important to check that the relationship between college
distance and likelihood of graduation is not simply an artifact of the chosen cutoff. In order
to test whether the significance of the results for low-income women is sensitive to the choice
of cutoff point, I re-estimate specification (4) from 1.8 using cutoffs between the 20th and
80th percentile, using intervals of five, and show the results in Figure 1.2. The coefficients
change depending on the cutoff, but they remain significant at the 5% level for any cutoff
between the the 20th and 70th percentile. When women whose parents are above the 40th
percentile are included in the sample, the impact of college distance gradually diminishes
into statistical insignificance.
Decomposing the Impact on Enrollment and Persistence
There are two potential ways college distance can affect the probability of a youth eventually
completing a four-year college degree. One is via its effect on the probability of enrolling in a
four-year degree, another is via its effect on the persistence in college for those who do enroll.
Figure 1.3 indicates that inequality in earning Bachelors degrees cannot be attributed purely
to differences in college enrollment; low-income youth have much lower levels of persistence
than their higher-income peers.
In order to identify the effect of college distance on enrollment, I run similar regressions
to what I ran in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, except I change the dependent variable to enrollment,
rather than graduation. To find the effect on persistence, I keep college graduation as the
dependent variable and restrict the sample to low-income female youths who enrolled in a
4.0592× log(2) = .041
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Loess regression using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997.
college working towards a four-year degree. Table 1.9 indicates that college distance may have
a small impact on the likelihood of enrollment, but it is not statistically distinguishable from
zero in all specifications. The relationship between college distance and persistence appears
to be larger and accounts for most of the effect of distance on the likelihood of graduation.
When applying the Bonferroni Correction, neither the coefficient on persistence, nor the
coefficient on enrollment is statistically significant at the 10% level, but they are significant
by the traditional measure of statistical significance. In the sample used for the regression,
young women whose parents are below the median income level and have enrolled in a
four-year college, 48 percent successfully completed college.
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Table 1.9: College Enrollment and Persistence: Low-Income Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Enrollment Persistence
Log(College Distance) −0.0496+ −0.0292 −0.0774+ −0.0779+
(0.0285) (0.0295) (0.0399) (0.0441)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.00928 −0.0209 −0.0201 −0.0233
(0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0217) (0.0265)
ASVAB Score 0.00848∗∗∗ 0.00926∗∗∗ 0.00571∗∗∗ 0.00495∗∗∗
(0.000505) (0.000591) (0.000987) (0.00115)
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 0.00105 0.00176+ 6.77e−05 −0.00158
(0.000958) (0.00105) (0.00162) (0.00184)
Mother’s Highest Grade 0.000882 0.00596
(0.00587) (0.00992)
County Inequality (Gini) 0.270 −0.209
(0.316) (0.542)
Median Income (County) −8.03e−07 −2.80e−06
(2.27e−06) (2.79e−06)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.0000421 0.00510
(0.00370) (0.00480)




Mixed Race −0.176 −0.254
(0.150) (0.200)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.235 0.0360 0.494 + + 0.684+
(0.153) (0.229) (0.220) (0.370)
Observations 1,266 1,096 486 431
R-squared 0.254 0.278 0.175 0.191
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++ p< 0.05, + p< 0.1
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Impact of Community College Distance
Community colleges are cheaper and easier to gain acceptance to than four-year colleges.
For students unable to attend a four-year college due to distance, financial cost, or lack
of academic preparation, proximity to a community college could provide a pathway to
eventually earning a four-year degree. Rouse (1995) finds that relative proximity to a two-
year college can increase years of schooling, although the effect on the likelihood of completing
a Bachelors degree is unclear. On the other hand, Zimmerman (2014) finds that attending
a two-year college instead of enrolling in a four-year college as a freshman, reduces the
probability that a student will eventually graduate from a four-year college. Zimmerman
identifies this causal effect by exploiting an arbitrary GPA cutoff used in admissions to four-
year colleges in Florida and compares the outcomes for students just below, and just above
the cutoff.
If community college provides a stepping stone to pursuing a Bachelors degree, one would
expect it to primarily affect the likelihood of enrollment in a four-year degree program, but
not the likelihood of persisting in that program once enrolled, especially given the results of
Zimmerman (2014). In Tables 1.10 and 1.11, I test the impact of community college distance
on three outcomes: the likelihood of enrolling in a four-year degree, the likelihood of finishing
a Bachelors degree conditional on enrolling in a four-year degree program (persistence),
and the unconditional likelihood of finishing a Bachelors degree. The results indicate that
community college distance also matters for four-year college completion rates, but through
a different mechanism than distance to a four-year public college. Proximity to a community
college is positively associated with enrollment in a four-year college, which results in an
association with the likelihood of finishing a four-year college degree. In contrast, once
community college distance is controlled for, proximity to a four-year college has almost no
effect on enrollment, but it continues to have an effect on the likelihood of completing college
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Table 1.10: Impact of Community College Proximity on College Outcomes
distributio (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Enrollment Persistence Graduation
Log(College Distance) −0.0286 −0.0797++ −0.0460*
(0.0275) (0.0402) (0.0189)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.0293+ −0.0185 −0.0280++
(0.0173) (0.0264) (0.0132)
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 0.00109 6.25e−05 0.000586
(0.000965) (0.00162) (0.000801)
ASVAB Score 0.00847*** 0.00571*** 0.00619***
(0.000505) (0.000990) (0.000486)
Log(Comm. College Distance) −0.0905++ 0.00779 −0.0531+
(0.0414) (0.0614) (0.0299)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.477* 0.475+ 0.335*
(0.195) (0.281) (0.146)
Observations 1,266 486 1,262
R-squared 0.257 0.175 0.232
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++ p< 0.05, + p< 0.1
conditional on enrollment. Therefore, both community college distance and four-year public
college distance have an effect on the unconditional likelihood of completing a four-year
college degree, but through different mechanisms.
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Table 1.11: Impact of Community College Proximity on College Outcomes: Low-Income
Women
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Enrollment Persistence Graduation
Log(College Distance) −0.000457 −0.0894++ −0.0435+
(0.0259) (0.0450) (0.0221)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.0429* −0.0152 −0.0355**
(0.0179) (0.0302) (0.0140)
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 0.00182+ −0.00162 0.000247
(0.00105) (0.00184) (0.000876)
ASVAB Score 0.00924*** 0.00493*** 0.00635***
(0.000591) (0.00116) (0.000555)
Log(Comm. College Distance) −0.117** 0.0415 −0.0639+
(0.0412) (0.0686) (0.0342)
Mother’s Highest Grade −0.000248 0.00641 0.00311
(0.00578) (0.0100) (0.00501)
County Inequality (Gini) 0.193 −0.178 −0.0828
(0.320) (0.548) (0.241)
Median Income (County) −9.08e−07 −2.69e−06 −1.88e−06
(2.26e−06) (2.80e−06) (1.53e−06)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.000398 0.00492 0.00302
(0.00378) (0.00482) (0.00224)
Black 0.145*** −0.0451 0.0372
(0.0356) (0.0686) (0.0278)
Hispanic 0.0808 −0.0464 0.00537
(0.0535) (0.0837) (0.0428)
Mixed Race −0.190 −0.250 −0.158 + +
(0.151) (0.202) (0.0753)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.370 0.565 0.413+
(0.286) (0.438) (0.229)
Observations 1,096 431 1,093
R-squared 0.283 0.191 0.239
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++ p< 0.05, + p< 0.1
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The Role of Family Obligations
Surette (2001) finds that in the NLSY 79 cohort (born between 1957 and 1964), women
graduating from two-year colleges were much less likely to transfer to four-year colleges
than men, and that those who did were less likely to graduate than men who transferred.
The author offers the hypothesis that men’s fewer family obligations could make it easier
to manage the additional travel necessary to access a four-year college campus, while for
women that may be more challenging. The same phenomenon could potentially explain why
college distance appears to matter so much for low-income women in the NLSY 97 cohort.
There are two types of family obligations that could hold women back more relative to
men. One is obligations to the nuclear family the youth was raised in. Parents may rely
more on their daughters than their sons for child care or caring for elderly relatives, and
this may make traveling a long distance to go to college difficult. The second is that college-
aged women may have their own children they are responsible for. If a woman is raising a
young child without the help of the child’s father, it becomes more valuable to her to remain
geographically close to the family that raised her, and logistically more difficult to commute
a long distance to college classes.
I examine both of these hypotheses, but I do not find any evidence for them. In Table
1.12, I restrict the data to only those youths who have not had any children by age 22. For
this subset of the data, the impact of college distance on women appears to be larger, not
smaller, undermining the hypothesis that the effect of college distance is driven by young
women with children.
If parental needs were causing young women to feel an obligation to stay close to home,
one would expect that phenomenon to be greatest for single parents who may need their
oldest children’s help more than married parents. I do not find any evidence to support this
hypothesis. In Table 1.13, I examine the impact of college distance on college graduation for
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specifically youths with single parents in the bottom half of the income distribution. For the
women in this sample, the effect of college distance is approximately the same as it is when
including youths with two parents. In Table 1.14, I interact a single parent dummy variable
with the college distance variable to see if it has an effect on the relationship between college
distance and college graduation. It does not. The coefficient on the college distance main
effect is approximately the same as before, while the coefficient on the interaction term, as
well as the single parent main effect, is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Impact of College Distance on Employment
Chetty et al. (2016) use IRS tax records to document geographic variation in economic
opportunity for men and women from various economic backgrounds. They link tax returns
of individuals when they were 30 years old to the tax returns of their parents when they
were children in the 1990s. With over 40 million observations, they were able to construct
relatively precise estimates of employment rates at age 30 for men and women with parents
from each quintile of the income distribution for nearly every county in the country. Using
their county-level estimates, I estimate the relationship between college distance and age
30 employment rate for men and women from each of the parental income quintiles. Given
my previous results with the same cohort, one would expect that college distance will be
negatively associated with employment rates for women from low-income backgrounds, but
less so, if at all, for men from low-income backgrounds. The results in Table 1.15 and 1.16
are consistent with this hypothesis. The women from the poorest backgrounds (column 1)
have the largest relationship between distance to a public college and employment rates,
and the women from the richest backgrounds (column 5) do not appear to have a significant
relationship between college distance and employment probability at age 30. College distance
does not appear to have a significant effect on the employment probability of men, consistent
with my earlier finding that college distance does not affect low-income men’s likelihood of
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Table 1.12: Impact of College Distance on the Likelihood of Graduating College for Youths
with No Children by Age 22
Sample: Observations in the bottom half of the parental income
distribution with no children of their own by age 22
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Men Women
Log(College Distance) −0.0294 0.0174 −0.107***
(0.0222) (0.0315) (0.0342)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.0167 0.00280 −0.0533**
(0.0108) (0.0132) (0.0180)
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 0.000357 0.00114 −0.000749
(0.000749) (0.000824) (0.00129)
ASVAB Score 0.00550*** 0.00440*** 0.00612***
(0.000426) (0.000497) (0.000736)
Black 0.0602* 0.0860** 0.0232
(0.0247) (0.0306) (0.0421)
Hispanic 0.0217 0.0773* −0.0473
(0.0336) (0.0342) (0.0571)
Mixed Race 0.123 0.244 −0.127
(0.144) (0.155) (0.302)
Mother’s Highest Grade 0.0140*** 0.0194*** 0.00792
(0.00450) (0.00524) (0.00693)
County Inequality (Gini) 0.118 0.148 −0.100
(0.193) (0.212) (0.361)
Median Income (County) 4.76e−07 1.39e−06 −1.47e−06
(1.33e−06) (1.57e−06) (2.26e−06)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.000872 −0.000498 0.00498
(0.00238) (0.00302) (0.00390)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.159 −0.537* 0.530+
(0.166) (0.216) (0.275)
Observations 1,995 1,194 801
R-squared 0.077 0.084 0.125
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++ p< 0.05, + p< 0.1
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Table 1.13: Impact of College Distance on the Likelihood of Graduating College for Youths
with a Single Parent
Sample: Children of single parents in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Men Women
Log(College Distance) −0.0336 0.0145 −0.0614 + +
(0.0232) (0.0309) (0.0278)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.0210+ −0.00344 −0.0323*
(0.0111) (0.0161) (0.0142)
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 0.00110 0.00105 0.00139
(0.000791) (0.00105) (0.00122)
ASVAB Score 0.00499*** 0.00333*** 0.00629***
(0.000487) (0.000715) (0.000754)
Black 0.0967*** 0.105** 0.0864 + +
(0.0276) (0.0386) (0.0393)
Hispanic 0.101** 0.0689 0.137**
(0.0371) (0.0428) (0.0533)
Mixed Race 0.0393 0.287 −0.127
(0.0977) (0.234) (0.0972)
Mother’s Highest Grade 0.0179** 0.0128+ 0.0195 + +
(0.00591) (0.00751) (0.00888)
County Inequality (Gini) 0.201 −0.0876 0.291
(0.202) (0.311) (0.286)
Median Income (County) 0.000550 −0.000587 0.000893
(0.00149) (0.00227) (0.00194)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.000790 0.00360 0.000311
(0.00268) (0.00432) (0.00300)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.269 −0.289 −0.218
(0.175) (0.265) (0.223)
Observations 1,136 528 608
R-squared 0.224 0.208 0.290
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++ p< 0.05, + p< 0.1
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Table 1.14: Interaction between College Distance and Coming from a Single Parent Family
Sample: All women observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: College Graduation
Log(Distance) −0.0655** −0.0642** −0.0686** −0.0623** −0.0791***
(0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0284)
Single Parent −0.0477 −0.0242 −0.0297 −0.0397 −0.0716
(0.0735) (0.0747) (0.0750) (0.0737) (0.0722)
Single Parent x −0.00120 −0.00172 2.98e−05 0.00343 0.0250
Log(Distance) (0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0275) (0.0270)
Log(Density) −0.0263** −0.0253** −0.0211* −0.0177* −0.0228*
(0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0118)
Parents’ Inc Perc 0.00273*** 0.00236*** 0.000230 8.87e−05
(0.000837) (0.000861) (0.000861) (0.000966)
Black −0.0599** 0.0357 0.0391
(0.0235) (0.0239) (0.0287)
Hispanic −0.0904*** −0.00853 0.00569
(0.0346) (0.0366) (0.0429)
Mixed Race −0.151** −0.154*** −0.154**
(0.0585) (0.0561) (0.0752)






County % with BA −4.52e−07
(1.01e−06)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.517*** 0.423*** 0.465*** 0.224* 0.199
(0.120) (0.121) (0.124) (0.117) (0.185)
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566 1,262 1,093
R-squared 0.058 0.067 0.074 0.234 0.237
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.15: Data on W-2 filing at age 30 drawn from Chetty et al. (2016)
Percent of women who grew up in each county employed at Age 30
Columns Indicate Parental Income Quintile:
Poorest Middle Richest
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Distance) −0.694∗∗∗ −0.357∗ −0.353∗∗ −0.393∗∗ −0.132
(0.234) (0.200) (0.179) (0.185) (0.226)
log(Pop. Dens.) −0.366∗∗ 0.169 −0.074 −0.127 0.131
(0.153) (0.131) (0.117) (0.122) (0.154)
Gini Coef. −4.402∗ −2.985 −1.502 2.160 −0.444
(2.259) (1.906) (1.707) (1.764) (2.217)
County % Black 0.137∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.026∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 72.014∗∗∗ 71.964∗∗∗ 78.031∗∗∗ 79.646∗∗∗ 82.182∗∗∗
(1.722) (1.474) (1.321) (1.367) (1.712)
Observations 2,683 2,752 2,747 2,698 2,334
R2 0.253 0.273 0.311 0.316 0.217
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
graduating from college.5
5 Even though the coefficient for men is not significant and the coefficient for women is, the difference
between the two coefficients is not statistically significant, so one should be cautious about interpreting these
results as showing a systematic difference between men and women.
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Table 1.16: Data on W-2 filing at age 30 drawn from Chetty et al. (2016)
Percent of men who grew up in each county employed at Age 30
Columns Indicate Parental Income Quintile:
Poorest Middle Richest
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Distance) −0.289 −0.097 −0.173 −0.198 −0.099
(0.227) (0.175) (0.148) (0.160) (0.191)
log(Pop Dens) −0.875∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.106 0.020
(0.148) (0.114) (0.097) (0.105) (0.130)
Gini Coef. −11.176∗∗∗ −6.261∗∗∗ −6.714∗∗∗ −9.288∗∗∗ −6.577∗∗∗
(2.173) (1.667) (1.413) (1.528) (1.897)
County % Black −0.094∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.017∗ −0.020
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 81.634∗∗∗ 84.519∗∗∗ 90.719∗∗∗ 92.644∗∗∗ 91.022∗∗∗
(1.668) (1.286) (1.094) (1.183) (1.447)
Observations 2,690 2,749 2,750 2,705 2,329
R2 0.356 0.342 0.286 0.147 0.124
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Impact of College Distance on Income
Evidence suggests that completing college has a causal impact on earnings, either through
its impact on productivity or by the way it affects employers’ perceptions of productivity,
or both. This effect appears to exist, even for academically marginal students (Zimmerman,
2014). One would expect, therefore, that if college distance affects the likelihood that lower-
income women graduate college, it would also raise their earnings in adulthood. I test
this hypothesis by running regressions with the same specifications as in Table 1.8, except
with average income percentile in adulthood as the dependent variable instead of college
graduation. Based on the results of Table 1.17, college distance appears to have a significant
effect on income in adulthood for lower-income young women, although the magnitude of
the effect can vary across the different specifications. Despite the uncertainty about the
magnitude of the effect, the results do suggest that college distance has an effect on the
upward mobility of young women from lower income backgrounds.
Card (1993) uses college proximity as an instrumental variable to estimate the causal
impact of college attendance on earnings in adulthood. If I were to use college distance as
an instrument for higher education, the estimated impact of college graduation on income
would most likely suffer from finite-sample bias since its t-statistic is below 3 in nearly all
specifications, and consequently its F -statistic is substantially below 10, which is the “rule-
of-thumb” cutoff for weak instruments (Staiger and Stock (1997); Bound et al. (1995)).
Another potential concern is that college distance might not be excludable from the second
stage equation. Colleges could have significant impacts on the local economy in more rural
areas, and may affect lower income people’s earning power, even if they did not go to college
at all. For this reason, I only estimate the reduced-form impact of college distance on income
in adulthood, and do not attempt to estimate the impact of college graduation on income
using college distance as an instrument.
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Table 1.17: Impact of College Distance on Adult Income Percentile
Sample: All women observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(College Distance) −2.557+ −4.074* −4.627** −4.617**
(1.402) (1.747) (1.792) (1.812)
Log(Pop. Density) 0.273 0.443 0.419 0.306
(0.775) (0.870) (1.006) (1.001)
ASVAB Score 0.343*** 0.348*** 0.346***
(0.0370) (0.0356) (0.0375)
Parents’ Inc. Percentile 0.249*** 0.238*** 0.237***
(0.0597) (0.0600) (0.0600)






Mixed Race −7.133 −6.919
(6.660) (6.764)
County Inequality (Gini) 0.209 −0.994
(16.87) (16.73)
Median Income (County) 9.25e−05 0.000102
(0.000103) (0.000102)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors −0.0588 −0.0453
(0.168) (0.172)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 39.14*** 23.49 + + 23.98+ 21.78+
(7.689) (10.44) (13.02) (12.93)
Observations 1,268 929 917 917
R-squared 0.079 0.257 0.254 0.257
Standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.0025, ** p< 0.0125, * p< 0.025, ++ p< 0.05, + p< 0.1
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Conclusion
Growing up near a public college appears to significantly improve the likelihood that women
from lower income backgrounds will be able to succeed in college. Cutting public four-year
college distance in half increases the probability of completing college by 4 percentage points
for a population that only has a 20 percent college graduation rate overall. This result
is robust to a range of controls, including parental income and education, race, population
density, inequality, county-level education and income levels, Armed Services Vocational Ap-
titude Battery scores (ASVAB) and state fixed effects. Proximity to a community college
appears to raise the probability of eventually enrolling in a four-year college, while proximity
to a four-year public college increases the probability of finishing conditional upon enroll-
ment. Through these distinct mechanisms, both proximity to a public four-year college and
proximity to a community college independently increase the probability that low-income
female youth will earn a Bachelors degree.
These results indicate that commuting costs may be a significant impediment to college
access and affordability for low-income female youth. Further study is necessary to determine
if high quality public transportation can offset the cost imposed by college distance.
College proximity also appears to affect the expected income percentile in adulthood for
women from lower income backgrounds, although the size of the effect is quite uncertain.
The same pattern persists when examining the probability of filing a W-2 at age 30 (a proxy
for employment). Poor women who grew up in counties closer to a public college are more
likely to be employed at age 30 than poor women who grew up far from a public four-year
college. College distance does not appear have any effect of on young men from lower income
backgrounds.
Angrist et al. (2009) examined a randomized trial at a large public university in which
some students were assigned financial incentives to maintain good grades, some students were
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assigned the opportunity to use extra academic counseling, some were assigned both, and
some were assigned neither. They found that women were much more likely to use the extra
academic counseling services than men, and that while women’s academic performance was
significantly improved by some of the treatments, men’s academic performance was virtually
unaffected. The authors were not able to explain why the discrepancy existed, but they did
note a number of other studies of higher education interventions, as well as interventions at
other education levels in which the impact was much stronger for women than for men.
It is not surprising that the results for college distance fit into that larger pattern, but
the question still remains, why does college distance matter so much more for women than
for men? The puzzle is less why women are affected by college distance, but rather why men
are not. In communities sufficiently far away from any nearby college, the college graduation
rates for men and women are equally low. In communities where a college is nearby, women
take advantage of the economic opportunity that that offers and graduate from college in
much higher numbers, whereas men simply do not. The critical unanswered question is why
men are not taking advantage of the opportunities available to them.
Regardless of whether men take advantage of geographically proximate colleges or not,
these results indicate that there is a significant group of young women from lower income
backgrounds who are able to succeed in college and graduate with a Bachelors degree if there
is a public four-year college nearby, but will not make it through college if they are forced
to travel a long distance. Furthermore, growing up close to a public college raises women’s
incomes in adulthood and their probability of being employed.
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Appendix
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Table 1.18: Logistic Model of College Graduation
Sample: Observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Men Women
Log(College Distance) 0.769 1.096 0.588**
(0.145) (0.313) (0.123)
Log(Population Density) 0.870* 0.914 0.815**
(0.0656) (0.105) (0.0718)
Parents’ Income Percentile 1.018*** 1.025*** 1.015**
(0.00475) (0.00711) (0.00658)
Mother Highest Grade 1.213*** 1.337*** 1.145***
(0.0423) (0.0725) (0.0472)
County Inequality (Gini) 2.378 13.78 1.255
(3.206) (27.32) (2.146)
Median Income (County) 1.000 1.000* 1.000
(9.05e−06) (1.38e−05) (1.13e−05)
% of 25+ pop. w/ a Bachelors 1.478 0.379 2.131
(2.248) (0.955) (4.009)
Non-Hispanic Black 0.756* 0.864 0.725
(0.120) (0.230) (0.143)
Black 0.949 1.372 0.782
(0.195) (0.413) (0.211)
Mixed Race 1.287 5.504*** 0.344
(0.593) (3.246) (0.266)
Observations 2,703 1,324 1,346
Coefficients reported as odds ratios
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.19: Impact of Four-Year College Distance on College Graduation: Alternative Spec-
ifications
Sample: All women observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(College Distance) −0.0653*** −0.0683*** −0.0598*** −0.0592***
(0.0219) (0.0223) (0.0197) (0.0225)
Log(Population Density) −0.0263** −0.0218** −0.0185* −0.0234**
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0118)
Parents’ Income Percentile 0.00301*** 0.00265*** 0.000559 0.000214
(0.000802) (0.000821) (0.000803) (0.000875)
ASVAB Score 0.00632*** 0.00637***
(0.000497) (0.000556)




Median Income (County) −1.82e−06
(1.53e−06)
% of 25+ Pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.282
(0.223)
Black −0.0646*** 0.0310 0.0393
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0282)
Hispanic −0.0855** −0.00273 0.0113
(0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0426)
Mixed Race −0.158*** −0.163*** −0.151**
(0.0586) (0.0564) (0.0752)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.407*** 0.444*** 0.196* 0.231
(0.116) (0.120) (0.104) (0.191)
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,262 1,093
R-squared 0.065 0.073 0.233 0.237
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.20: Impact of Community College Distance on College Graduation
Sample: All women observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(College Distance) −0.0541** −0.0539** −0.0547** −0.0474** −0.0435*
(0.0231) (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0189) (0.0221)
Log(Comm Coll Dist) −0.0487 −0.0456 −0.0551* −0.0545* −0.0639*
(0.0296) (0.0292) (0.0297) (0.0303) (0.0342)
Log(Pop. Density) −0.0386*** −0.0359*** −0.0333*** −0.0303** −0.0355**
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0140)
Parents’ Inc Perc 0.00299*** 0.00260*** 0.000573 0.000247
(0.000802) (0.000820) (0.000805) (0.000876)
ASVAB Score 0.00630*** 0.00635***
(0.000495) (0.000555)
Mother Highest Grade 0.00311
(0.00501)




% of 25+ pop. w/ a BA 0.302
(0.224)
Black −0.0658*** 0.0283 0.0372
(0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0278)
Hispanic −0.0899*** −0.00736 0.00537
(0.0344) (0.0368) (0.0428)
Mixed Race −0.167*** −0.170*** −0.158**
(0.0593) (0.0563) (0.0753)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.626*** 0.525*** 0.589*** 0.343** 0.413*
(0.130) (0.133) (0.138) (0.148) (0.229)
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566 1,262 1,093
R-squared 0.055 0.067 0.075 0.235 0.239
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.21: Alternative Specifications for Linear Probability Model
Sample: All men observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(College Distance) 0.00939 0.00958 0.0125 0.0132
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0276)
Log(Population Density) 0.00353 0.00580 0.00811 −0.00245
(0.00882) (0.00901) (0.0101) (0.0116)
Parents’ Income Percentile 0.00247*** 0.00236*** 0.00130* 0.00123*
(0.000553) (0.000575) (0.000688) (0.000723)
ASVAB Score 0.00452*** 0.00409***
(0.000462) (0.000463)




Median Income (County) 1.60e−06
(1.43e−06)
% of 25+ Pop. w/ a Bachelors −0.0451
(0.279)
Black −0.0225 0.0735*** 0.0776***
(0.0212) (0.0248) (0.0275)
Hispanic −0.0229 0.0320 0.0763**
(0.0259) (0.0274) (0.0308)
Mixed Race 0.308** 0.309* 0.251
(0.147) (0.158) (0.157)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.0145 −0.0137 −0.197* −0.480**
(0.0990) (0.0991) (0.111) (0.196)
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,217 1,036
R-squared 0.037 0.045 0.181 0.194
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.22: Alternative Specifications for All Low-Income Youth
Sample: All observations in the bottom half of parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: College Graduate
Log(College Distance) −0.0264 −0.0282 −0.0228 −0.0254
(0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0151) (0.0189)
Log(Population Density) −0.0108 −0.00702 −0.00425 −0.0132
(0.00780) (0.00792) (0.00748) (0.00887)
Parents’ Income Percentile 0.00278*** 0.00252*** 0.000939* 0.000684
(0.000486) (0.000504) (0.000540) (0.000578)
ASVAB Score 0.00555*** 0.00535***
(0.000343) (0.000363)




Median Income (County) −2.78e− 08
(1.07e− 06)
% of 25+ Pop. w/ a Bachelors 0.0870
(0.179)
Non-Hispanic Black −0.0457*** 0.0537*** 0.0585***
(0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0190)
Hispanic −0.0581** 0.0125 0.0407
(0.0232) (0.0239) (0.0277)
Mixed Race 0.0441 0.0492 0.0305
(0.0721) (0.0733) (0.0806)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.188** 0.207** −0.0124 −0.122
(0.0880) (0.0905) (0.0824) (0.142)
Observations 3,166 3,166 2,479 2,129
R-squared 0.037 0.041 0.191 0.193
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.23: Specifications for Impact of College Distance on Income Percentile
Sample: All women observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(College Distance) −2.354* −2.529* −2.485 −4.617**
(1.362) (1.335) (1.695) (1.812)
Log(Population Density) 0.572 0.922 0.968 0.306
(0.740) (0.750) (0.853) (1.001)
Parents’ Income Percentile 0.295*** 0.275*** 0.218*** 0.237***
(0.0574) (0.0576) (0.0579) (0.0600)
ASVAB Score 0.345*** 0.346***
(0.0320) (0.0375)




Median Income (County) 0.000102
(0.000102)
% of 25+ Pop. w/ a Bachelors −4.531
(17.18)
Non-Hispanic Black −6.723*** −0.0320 −0.621
(1.846) (2.100) (2.367)
Hispanic −2.774 2.979 3.514
(2.404) (2.501) (2.797)
Mixed Race −6.609 −6.128 −6.919
(5.026) (5.158) (6.764)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 29.11*** 31.29*** 15.96* 21.78*
(7.615) (7.583) (9.159) (12.93)
Observations 1,268 1,268 1,048 917
R-squared 0.106 0.117 0.252 0.257
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.24: Alternative Specifications for Low-Income Men
Sample: All men observations in the bottom half of the parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dependent variable: College Graduate
Log(College Distance) 0.00939 0.00958 0.0125 0.0132
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0276)
Log(Pop. Density) 0.00353 0.00580 0.00811 −0.00245
(0.00882) (0.00901) (0.0101) (0.0116)
Parents’ Inc. Perc. 0.00247∗∗∗ 0.00236∗∗∗ 0.00130∗ 0.00123∗
(0.000553) (0.000575) (0.000688) (0.000723)
ASVAB Score 0.00452∗∗∗ 0.00409∗∗∗
(0.000462) (0.000463)




Median Income (County) 1.60e−06
(1.43e−06)
% of Pop w/ a BA −0.0451
(0.279)
Non-Hispanic Black −0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0310 0.0393
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0282)
Hispanic −0.0855 ∗ ∗ −0.00273 0.0113
(0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0426)
Mixed Race −0.158 ∗ ∗∗ −0.163 ∗ ∗∗ −0.151 ∗ ∗
(0.0586) (0.0564) (0.0752)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.407 ∗ ∗∗ 0.444 ∗ ∗∗ 0.196∗ 0.231
(0.116) (0.120) (0.104) (0.191)
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,217 1,036
R-squared 0.037 0.045 0.181 0.194
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.25: Alternatice Specifications for High-Income Men
Sample: All men observations in the top half of the parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dependent variable: College Graduate
Log(College Distance) 0.0519* 0.0423 0.0433 0.0533*
(0.0287) (0.0291) (0.0271) (0.0294)
Log(Pop. Density) 0.0266* 0.0304** 0.0212 0.0138
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0169)
Parents’ Inc. Perc. 0.00752*** 0.00689*** 0.00478*** 0.00398***
(0.000743) (0.000769) (0.000841) (0.000899)
ASVAB Score 0.00690*** 0.00646***
(0.000391) (0.000447)




Med. Inc. (County) −7.71e−07
(1.99e−06)
% of Pop w/ a BA 0.365
(0.294)
Non-Hispanic Black −0.0646*** 0.0310 0.0393
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0282)
Hispanic −0.0855** −0.00273 0.0113
(0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0426)
Mixed Race −0.158*** −0.163*** −0.151**
(0.0586) (0.0564) (0.0752)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.407*** 0.444*** 0.196* 0.231
(0.116) (0.120) (0.104) (0.191)
Observations 1,757 1,757 1,504 1,414
R-squared 0.092 0.101 0.258 0.272
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.26: Alternatice Specifications for High-Income Women
Sample: All women observations in the top half of the parental income distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dependent variable: College Graduate
Log(College Distance) −0.00890 −0.0131 0.0103 0.0356
(0.0304) (0.0298) (0.0273) (0.0287)
Log(Pop. Density) 0.00548 0.00546 0.0121 −0.00818
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0183)
Parents’ Inc. Perc. 0.00835*** 0.00799*** 0.00542*** 0.00384***
(0.000874) (0.000898) (0.000942) (0.000973)
ASVAB Score 0.00752*** 0.00664***
(0.000415) (0.000487)




Median Income (County) 2.75e−06
(2.10e−06)
% of Pop w/ a BA −0.0889
(0.352)
Non-Hispanic Black −0.0646*** 0.0310 0.0393
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0282)
Hispanic −0.0855** −0.00273 0.0113
(0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0426)
Mixed Race −0.158*** −0.163*** −0.151**
(0.0586) (0.0564) (0.0752)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.407*** 0.444*** 0.196* 0.231
(0.116) (0.120) (0.104) (0.191)
Observations 1,757 1,757 1,504 1,414
R-squared 0.092 0.101 0.258 0.272
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Chapter 2
A Cross-National Study of the Gender
Gap in the Economic Consequences of
Divorce: Decomposing the Effects of
Custody, Wage Rates, and Tax and
Transfer Programs
Co-authored with Neil G. Bennett
Introduction
Marriage and family formation can improve economic well-being. Two basic economic con-
cepts can explain its value: specialization and economies of scale. When two people form
a family, each can (or can choose not to) specialize in different types of labor, whether it
be earning cash income, caring for children, doing home repairs, preparing meals or other
51
CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 52
household needs (Becker, 1981). Two people can also benefit from economies of scale. By
sharing a home, for example, their per person housing and utilities costs are significantly
lower. Further, necessities like refrigerators, washing machines, and a car can be more effi-
ciently shared if two people are sharing a home. The flip side of these economic benefits of
marriage is that there can be large and potentially severe economic consequences of divorce.
Upon divorce, the economic gains of marriage are reversed, and it is inevitable that at
least one partner initially ends up in a worse economic position. Family income that is con-
tributed to and spent by two people during marriage is split, with each spouse experiencing
both a reduction in income and a reduction in economic needs. If both family income and
post-divorce economic needs were evenly split (i.e., when a childless couple with similar labor
income divorces) the reduction in income would be larger than the reduction in economic
needs because of the loss of economies of scale. Two people who shared one home, one heat-
ing bill, one wifi network, and one set of household chores, would have to pay for separate
homes, separate heating bills, and separate wifi networks, in addition to the fact that each
person would have to take care of the chores either personally or by “outsourcing.”
Further, the specialization that can be Pareto optimal in a marriage can make the conse-
quences of divorce more severe. In a marriage, it can potentially be better for both partners
and their children for one partner to specialize more in paid employment and for the other to
specialize in child rearing. The problem with this upon divorce is that the partner who spe-
cializes in child rearing tends to keep custody of the children while losing access to the income
of the partner who specializes in paid employment. In addition, the child rearing partner’s
earning potential may have suffered due to time spent out of the labor force. In other words,
specializing in child rearing during marriage results in lower income and greater economic
need upon divorce. These relative specializations, and the problems they pose upon divorce,
can also be a result of cultural pressure for men and women to conform to traditional roles
within the family, rather than utility maximization on the part of the married partners.
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Divorces in which both partners experience an equally reduced economic position post-
divorce are not typical. What occurs much more frequently is that women experience a sharp
reduction in economic well-being, while men experience a more moderate one or perhaps an
increase in economic well-being. This pattern was first observed by demographers such as
Hoffman (1977) and Duncan and Hoffman (1985) in the aftermath of a sharp spike in the
divorce rate. Subsequent studies of the economic consequences of divorce by gender include
Peterson (1996) and Smock et al. (1999), who find that women do significantly worse than
men to varying degrees. Burkhauser et al. (1991) compares the economic fate of divorcing
women in the United States and West Germany, and finds that they fare approximately
equally badly in both countries.
These findings could be easily anticipated with prior knowledge of a few demographic
facts: men have higher labor income than women, divorcing women are more likely to retain
custody of children than men, and many women do not receive the alimony and child support
to which they are legally entitled. All of the studies cited above used data from the 1970s and
1980s, but Figures 2.1-2.5 illustrate demographic trends that could potentially equalize the
economic consequences of divorce. Women’s wage rates and labor force participation have
risen and the burden of post-divorce child-rearing has diminished for women and slightly
increased for men. The reason for this is twofold: divorcing couples have fewer children
on average than they used to and men are more likely than before to have custody. Based
on those trends, one might expect the economic consequences of divorce to have become
significantly less severe for women and potentially worse for men.
This paper updates prior findings on the economic consequences of divorce in the United
States using more recent waves of the PSID. In addition, it places those findings in an inter-
national context by estimating the economic consequences of divorce for five other OECD
countries: Australia, Germany, Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Finally, we
examine the impact of factors contributing to the unequal outcomes for men and women
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through a sequence a counterfactual scenarios. We estimate how the economic consequences
of divorce would differ if men typically received full custody of children, if women earned
wages as high as equally educated men, and if the United States’ tax and transfer policies
were replaced by the policies of each of the other countries that we have data on.
The uneven economic consequences of divorce has potentially far-reaching impact beyond
divorcing couples and their children. The potential for divorce, and the reduction in economic
circumstances it can induce, could potentially influence the amount of control married men
and women have over family decisions and resources. Conversely, the severity of the economic
decline of a potential divorce can potentially keep people in unhappy marriages.
McElroy et al. (1981) propose a Nash bargaining model of household decision-making
in which each partner’s threat point plays a crucial role. In this model, the economic con-
sequences of divorce, if known by both partners, will influence each partner’s power over
household decision making while still married. Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori et al. (2002)
refined McElroy and Horney’s model into a “collective model” in which the partners always
find a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, but how resources are shared is still determined
by bargaining power. The authors define the concept of a “distribution factor”, which is any
factor that influences the bargaining power of either partner without influencing either their
preferences or budget constraint. They consider divorce laws and the statewide sex ratio
as distribution factors because they both influence each partner’s well-being post-divorce
without affecting the household budget while married. Using data from the 1989 wave of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), they find that divorce laws that were favorable
to women significantly increased the amount of household income directed towards private
consumption by wives.
More and more couples who are marrying and divorcing are composed of two men, two
women, or at least one person who does not conform to a binary gender classification. The
economic impact of divorce for these couples has not been carefully studied and is in need
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of further inquiry. Nonetheless, this paper will focus on divorces between men and women,
primarily because that is the population for which we have sufficient sample size to study.
Data
We use panel data sets from six developed countries: the United States (Panel Study of
Income Dynamics), Australia (Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia), Ger-
many (Socio-Economic Panel), Korea (Korean Labor and Income Panel Survey), Switzer-
land (Swiss Household Panel), and the United Kingdom (British Household Panel Survey
and Understanding Society). Each one of these panels collaborates with the Cross-National
Equivalent File (CNEF), which constructs a set of economic and demographic variables that
are harmonized across the panel surveys (Burkhauser et al., 2000).
Panel data are crucial for our study because they allow us to observe individuals’ eco-
nomic outcomes both pre- and post-divorce. Also of particular importance for our work,
is a measure of post-government income constructed by the CNEF and harmonized across
countries, which subtracts out taxes and adds in the value of government transfers, such as
welfare payments and housing vouchers. For the United States, post-government income is
estimated using NBER’s TAXSIM model; for other countries, the CNEF uses similar proce-
dures that have been developed for each country. For example, they use Schwarze (1995) to
estimate the post-government income for German households. The CNEF income variables
also add an estimate of the rent homeowners avoid minus mortgage interest and other costs
of homeownership, which allows the impact of housing wealth to be included in our measure
of economic well-being. This is particularly important for measuring economic well-being
post-divorce, since many divorcing couples own a home and if one partner keeps it, that has
a significant effect on his or her economic well-being relative to his or her ex-spouse.
The data are restricted to individuals who are married and living with a partner in a
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given year and then observed as divorced two years later. Data from the United States go
back to the 1970s and for Germany they go back to the 1980s, but the other countries we
study do not go back that far. In order to have a consistent set of years across countries,
we limit the data to observations from the year 2000 until the present. This limitation also
allows us to focus on the divorces occurring after the demographic changes documented in
Figures 2.1-2.3 (rise in women’s hours worked, change in wage rates, and shift in custody).
Finally, our analysis relies on estimating income after taxes and transfers on the basis of pre-
tax income and family size. These estimates are far more accurate when limiting the data
to individuals who are not receiving pension income, so we restrict the data to individuals
divorcing below the age of 60.
Table 2.1 describes the characteristics of the divorcing individuals in our sample by
country and sex. Across all countries except for the United Kingdom, women have lower
wages and labor income than men do. The result in the United Kingdom is most likely due
to an extremely high income woman in the sample. When the data are trimmed to remove
one percent of the sample (top .5% and bottom .5%) females in the United Kingdom have
lower average incomes than their male counterparts (see Table 2.2).
Across all countries, women have custody of more children on average post-divorce than
men do. The number of children divorcing couples have, and the discrepancy between the
sexes vary considerably, with women in the United States and the United Kingdom having
the greatest burden, women in Korea having the lowest, and women in Switzerland, Germany,
and Australia in between.
Defining Economic Well-Being
Families of different sizes have different levels of economic need. A single person with no
children earning $50,000 per year has a far higher level of economic well-being than a family
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of five with the same income. For this reason, we define a size-adjusted income based on an




Adjusted Income assumes economies of scale in household consumption by using the square
root of household size as an equivalence scale. Reducing household size from two people to
one person does not cut assumed economic needs in half, but instead cuts it by a smaller
amount. This assumption is appropriate when a significant portion of household expenses
are for resources that can be efficiently shared, such as housing and kitchen appliances, rather
than items that are consumed individually such as prepared food or clothes.
We do not use the Census Bureau’s Official Poverty Threshold or the Supplemental
Poverty Measure because we are conducting international comparisons and different countries
have different statistical agencies with different methods of computing poverty thresholds.
Instead, we follow the relative poverty measure for international comparisons laid out in
detail in Smeeding et al. (2000) and Smeeding (2006) and define the poverty threshold as
Poverty Threshold =
Median Adjusted IncomeCountry, Year
2
This has the virtue of allowing us to avoid worrying about inflation, exchange rates, pur-
chasing power parity, or recessions since the poverty threshold adjusts each year based on
median nominal income in local currency.






This definition of economic well-being assumes a logarithmic utility function, meaning that
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change in economic well-being is determined by percentage drop in income, rather than
absolute drop: a $10,000 loss in household income upon divorce for a person with a fam-
ily income of $30,000 pre-divorce produces a drop in economic well-being equivalent to a
$100,000 reduction in household income upon divorce for a person with a family income of
$300,000 pre-divorce. This assumption is appropriate if one believes that the marginal utility
of income decreases with each additional unit of family income.
The economic consequences of divorce for an individual will be the difference between
their economic well-being pre-divorce while married, and their observed economic well-being












Our choice of poverty threshold (half of median adjusted income) varies only by year, not by
family size, so ∆EWB will be driven predominantly by changes in adjusted income (which
is affected by both income and family size).
U.S. Trends in the Economic Consequences of Divorce
Figure 2.6 illustrates how post-divorce economic well-being in the United States have changed
over time, and Figures 2.1-2.5 illustrate the social and economic variables that have a major
impact on it have changed as well. The trends illustrated in the figures are estimated using
a Loess Regression, with the gray shaded area showing the 95% confidence interval.
While the economic consequences of divorce have begun to diminish for women, they
have done so slowly and women still experience a sharp drop in economic well-being upon
divorce. This is driven partially by the fact that divorced women still work fewer hours and
are paid at a lower hourly rate than their male counterparts. It is also driven by the fact that
women are more likely to have custody over children than men, which raises their economic
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needs. While the number of children women have custody over post-divorce declined steadily
in the 1970s and 1980s, it leveled off in the 1990s and has remained relatively flat since then.
Estimating the Gap in Economic Consequences of
Divorce between Men and Women by Country
To estimate how the gap in economic well-being between men and women varies among the
six countries in our data, we specify the following regression:




βjCountryj + βj+5Female× Countryj
)
+ ε (2.2)
By specifying the United States and Male as the excluded dummy variables, β̂0 estimates the
economic consequences of divorce for men in the United States, β̂1 estimates how the impact
of divorce on economic well-being differs between men and women in the United States, the
β̂2-β̂k coefficients estimate how the economic consequences of divorce differs among countries
for men, and the β̂k+1-β̂2k−1 coefficients are how the gap in the economic consequences of
divorce between men and women differs across countries. The results of this regression are
shown in the first column of Table 2.4. The constant term is .072, which indicates that men
in the United States experience a small increase in economic well-being, while women in the
United States fare substantially worse. The gap in ∆EWB between men and women in the
United States, −.419, is larger than in any other country studied. Most notably, the gap in
∆EWB between men and women in the United Kingdom is smaller by .316, and in Korea
by .241. Switzerland and Germany also have gaps that are statistically significantly smaller
than the one in the United States. Australia’s estimated gap in ∆EWB between men and
women is also smaller than the one in the United States, but the difference is not statistically
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significant.
The first column of Figure 2.8 translates the coefficients from Table 2.4 into estimated
outcomes for men and women in each country. Regardless of how they fare relative to the
divorcing men in their country, women from the United States fare worse in our sample than
women in any other country on average, but the difference is statistically significant only for
Korea and the United Kingdom. The subsequent columns in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.8 show
the results of estimating Equation 2.2 under counterfactual scenarios.
Counterfactuals
Reassigning Custody
Our first counterfactual reassigns custody of all children under 18 to men. This means that
for divorcing women, we reduce their household size by the number of children they retained
custody over post-divorce. For example, if a woman has a household size of three, herself
and two children under 18 who she retained custody over, her counterfactual household
size would be one (household size of three minus the two children). For divorcing men, we
add the number of children below 16 pre-divorce to their post-divorce household size, and
subtract any children men did retain custody over post-divorce to avoid double-counting.
So, for example, if a divorced man has a household size of four, a new partner, the partner’s
child and one child under 18 he retained custody over, but pre-divorce he had three children,
ages 17, 15, and 13, then his counterfactual household size would be five (household size
of four plus two pre-divorce children under age 16 minus one post-divorce child he retained
custody over equals five). Pre-divorce 17-year olds are not assigned to men’s custody under
the counterfactual because they would be over 18 by the time of the post-divorce observation
two years later and could potentially be living on their own.
CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 61
Estimating the Impact of Household Size on Taxes and Transfers

















We can then compute a counterfactual level of economic well-being, EWBC , that results
from a change of HHSIZE to a counterfactual HHSIZEC :

















If we naively assume that the counterfactual post-government income, ICPost-gov, is equal to
IPost-gov, then the effect of household size on economic well-being is very straightforward:






Of course, a change in household size ceteris paribus will lead to a change in tax burden
and eligibility for transfer programs, so it would indeed be naive to assume that ICPost-gov =
IPost-gov, and doing so would lead to an exaggerated estimate of the negative economic con-
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sequences of retaining custody. Consequently, we must modify Equation 2.4 as follows:

















We need to understand how IPost-Gov changes as HHSIZE changes as part of our coun-
terfactual. To do this, we estimate a regression that will allow us to directly estimate the


































Once we have estimated the coefficients in Equation 2.6, we can estimate change in log(IPost-gov)
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We can then plug this into Equation 2.5 to find a plausible estimate of EWBC :
EWBC = EWB + (log(HHSIZE)− log(HHSIZEc))×(












The estimated coefficients of Equation 2.6 for each country are in Table 2.3. The estimated
relationship between pre-government income, household size, and post-government income
for each country is graphed in Figure 2.7. They reveal differences across countries in how
an increase in household size affects post-government income. In Australia, Germany, and
the United Kingdom, shifts in household size produce big shifts in tax burden and transfer
income. In these countries, more of the economic burden of having custody over children
will be mitigated by government transfers. In contrast, in Korea and Switzerland household
size has very little effect on post-government income. Given these differences, it is important
that we factor the effect of household size on post-government income into our custody
counterfactual.
There are also significant differences across countries in implicit tax rates after taking
into account both tax and transfer programs. Single households in Germany, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom have high implicit tax rates, whereas Korea has a particularly
low one. It is important to account for these differences when constructing counterfactual
scenarios that would improve female labor income and thus raise household pre-government
income.
Estimating the Overall Impact of Household Size on Economic Well-Being
Using the counterfactual household sizes, each individual’s pre-government income, and
country-specific parameter estimates for Equation 2.6, we estimate the impact of the coun-
terfactual on each person’s post-divorce economic well-being. This, in turn, allows us to
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estimate a counterfactual change in economic well-being upon divorce, which is the change
in economic well-being we expect to have occurred if men always retained custody of chil-
dren, assuming no change in pre-government income. We make this assumption because
an individual’s new income resulting from this counterfactual could plausibly be higher or
lower than the actual income observed post-divorce. It might be higher due to a need to
earn greater income to be able to pay for child care, for example, or it may be lower due to
the individual’s need or desire to spend more time at home to care for his children in the
absence of such child care.
Column 3 of Table 2.4 shows the results of estimating Equation 2.2 with counterfactual
custody assignment. The gap between men and women’s economic consequences of divorce
is nearly eliminated. It is equal to −.068 and not statistically significantly different from
zero. Not only is this gap much smaller under this counterfactual scenario, it is smaller
than the gap for several other countries studied. Switzerland, Germany, and Australia all
have a larger estimated gap in the economic consequences of divorce between men and
women than the United States under this scenario, although none of those differences is
statistically significant. This stands in contrast to the situation we observe with the true
custody assignments, in which the gap for the United States is larger than every other
country. In the United Kingdom and Korea, the gap is flipped so that women fare better
upon divorce than men when custody is re-assigned from women to men.
Eliminating the Wage Gap
A widely documented fact about the labor markets of developed countries is the “wage gap,”
which refers to the fact that women are paid substantially less per hour of work than men.
While there is some argument about what the sources of the discrepancy are, there is no
doubt that it holds even after adjusting for level of education. Nor is there any debate that
on average the “wage gap” reduces the economic well-being of families that rely solely on
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the mother for income, which characterizes the circumstances of most households headed by
recently divorced women. If the wage gap were eliminated, we would expect the economic
consequences of divorce to be less severe for women because their family income would drop
less in percentage terms. For men, the economic consequences of divorce would become more
severe because the loss of their wives’ incomes would have a more substantial impact on their
household income.
We explore the counterfactual of what would happen to the economic consequences of
divorce if the “wage gap” were eliminated and women were paid the same hourly amount on
average as men with the same educational level. We first estimate wage gaps, by splitting
the data into categories based on years of education (less than 12 years, 12 years, greater
than 12 but less than 16 years, 16 years, and greater than 16 years) and estimating a “wage






= β0 + β1Male + ε (2.9)
The results from estimating Equation 2.9 for each country and education level appear in
Tables 2.8-2.13. The data from the United Kingdom do not have years of education, so we
simply estimate the wage gap for the entire population.
Using those results, we can then modify each woman’s pre-tax family income using the







+ (eβ̂1 − 1)× Labor Income
Poverty Threshold
(2.10)
Family income before taxes and transfers (IPre-gov/PT ) is modified both pre- and post-divorce
based on pre-and post-divorce labor income of each divorcing woman. For divorcing men,
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pre-divorce family income is modified based on the counterfactual pre-divorce labor income
of their ex-wives.
The counterfactual pre-government income,
IcPre-Gov
Poverty Threshold
, in conjunction with the country-
level parameter estimates β̂2, β̂3, β̂4, and β̂5 from Equation 2.6, can be used to estimate the
effect on economic well-being from equalizing women’s wage rates with men’s.



















β̂3 + β̂5 log(HHSIZE)
)
(2.11)
In order to estimate the change in economic well-being upon divorce for both men and
women, we construct counterfactual levels of economic well-being for both pre- and post-
divorce for all divorcing individuals.
The results from this counterfactual scenario are in Column 2 of Table 2.4. The gap
between men and women’s economic well-being diminishes moderately when women’s wages
are raised so that they have the same average wage rate as men with an equivalent level
of education. The gap is −.267, significantly smaller than the gap with actual wage rates,
−.419, but it is still quite large and significantly different from zero. The difference between
the gap for the United States and the gap for other countries shrinks for every country
except Korea, and for Switzerland and Germany it stops being statistically significant (it
was already statistically insignificant for Australia).
Welfare State Counterfactual
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.7 indicate that there are dramatic differences in the tax and transfer
policies across the six countries in our data set. The United States in particular has a
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regressive tax and transfer system relative to countries such as Germany and the United
Kingdom. If the United States’ tax and transfer system were closer to the more progressive
OECD countries, the economic consequences of divorce for women could potentially be much
less severe. In this section we estimate how the economic consequences of divorce would
change if each country’s tax and transfer system were imposed on divorcing individuals in
every other country.
Using the regression specified in Equation 2.6, we estimate the relationship between
post-government family income, pre-government family income, and household size for each
country separately. The coefficient estimates are in Table 2.3. We use the difference in the
estimated parameters of Equation 2.6 for one country with the estimated parameters of a
second country to estimate the change. For example, to estimate the impact of imposing the
U.K. tax and transfer policies on a U.S. family, we use Equation 2.12 below.
EWBc =EWB + (β̂UK1 − β̂US1 )× log(HHSIZE)+
























For each country we also estimate the counterfactual of having no taxes and transfers by
using pre-government income to estimate change in economic well-being rather than post-
government income. The results are shown in Table 2.6, and the impact of applying each
country’s tax and transfer program to the United States is illustrated in Figure 2.12. We
find that divorcing U.S. women would fare significantly better under the tax and transfer
policies of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia, approximately the same under the
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tax and transfer policies of Switzerland, and worse with Korean tax and transfer policies.
Discussion
The gap between men’s and women’s outcomes is larger in the United States than any other
country and those differences are statistically significant for every country except for Aus-
tralia. These differences across countries change significantly under different counterfactual
scenarios.
For the United States, custody has an overwhelming impact on the economic well-being
of women and men. Divorcing U.S. women have custody of more children on average than
divorcing women in every single other country except the United Kingdom, most likely due
to the United States’ high fertility rate relative to many other developed countries. While
divorcing women in the United Kingdom have custody over the same number of children on
average as their counterparts in the United States, Figure 2.7 and Table 2.3 illustrate that
the U.K.’s tax and transfer programs compensate for family size much more than the United
States does.
Eliminating the wage gap between men and women would mitigate the negative conse-
quences of divorce for women, but in the United States that effect is much smaller than
the effect of changing current custody arrangements. Elimination of the wage gap not only
raises post-divorce income, but also raises pre-divorce income, meaning that there is still a
significant percentage drop in income upon divorce. Women also have lower labor force par-
ticipation rates than men, even post-divorce, which limits the impact of equalizing average
wages by education level. In most other countries, the impact of eliminating the wage gap
is small as well.
The fact that custody has the larger effect on the economic consequences of divorce than
the wage gap explains why the gap in the economic consequences of divorce is large in the
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United States and most likely will remain large despite women’s increasing success in the
labor market. Women still are much more likely to retain custody of children post-divorce,
and the number of children women typically retain custody over has plateaued since the
mid-1990s (Figure 2.3). We may in fact be underestimating the full effect of custody on
the economic consequences of divorce because we are assuming no change in labor force
participation. Custody not only raises an individual’s economic needs, but also constrains
the amount of time and energy divorced parents can dedicate to paid labor. It is possible
that custody has an even larger affect on the gender gap in economic consequences of divorce
than we have estimated. On the other hand, it is also possible that divorcing fathers may
have ways of adjusting their behavior to compensate for the assignment of custody in our
counterfactual scenario. We assume no changes in behavior and therefore may miss some
potential ways divorcing fathers could offset the increased economic needs induced by the
re-assignment of custody.
Tax and transfer programs play a role in mitigating the economic consequences of divorce.
In every country studied, except for Korea, the consequences of divorce would be more
severe if we used pre-tax income to construct economic well-being. In some countries, the
impact of tax and transfer programs is greater than others. Divorcing U.S. women would
be substantially better off if they lived under the tax and transfer policies of Australia,
Germany, or especially the United Kingdom. Differences in tax and transfer policies can
almost entirely explain cross-country differences in the gap between men’s and women’s
economic outcomes post-divorce. If the United States had tax and transfer policies similar
to the United Kingdom or Germany, the U.S. gap would be roughly similar to the gap in
those two countries.
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Robustness Checks
An outlier in the United Kingdom significantly raises the average economic well-being of
divorcing women there. This can be seen by comparing the average annualized wage, labor
income, and post-government income for U.K. women in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. In Table
2.1, which includes all the data, U.K. divorcing women have a higher average wage rate,
labor income, and post-government income than their male counterparts. In Table 2.2,
which shows trimmed means (cutting out the top .5% and bottom .5% of the distribution)
U.K. women have significantly lower average values.
We redo the analysis using quantile regressions to find the conditional median to test
whether our results are being driven by outliers. Table 2.5 estimates the same regression
models as Table 2.4, except it estimates the conditional median rather than the conditional
mean. Figure 2.9 illustrates the median outcomes for men and women in each country in
each scenario. Median outcomes do not appear to differ substantially from mean outcomes.
Conclusion
We find that in the 21st century, the economic consequences of divorce continue to be more
severe for women than for men. We examine six countries, each with different levels of
female labor force participation and wage rates, different levels of child-bearing pre-divorce,
and different tax and transfer programs. Differences in economic well-being by sex exist in
every country, although the discrepancy is by far the largest in the United States. In general,
the discrepancy in all countries is due to a combination of factors, namely, large differences
in child custody practices and in wage rates. The effects of these differences are partially
offset by each country’s tax and transfer system, with more progressive systems benefiting
divorcing women relative to divorcing men.
Even if U.S. women were to attain wage equality with equivalently well-educated men,
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or if U.S. tax and transfer programs were as progressive as those in Germany or the United
Kingdom, divorcing U.S. women would still experience a large reduction in economic well-
being upon divorce and fare much worse on average than their ex-husbands. The primary
mechanism driving this discrepancy is U.S. women’s custody over children upon divorce and
the inadequacy of tax and transfer policies to compensate for this differential. Unless custody
upon divorce is more evenly shared between men and women, fertility rates decline among
couples who eventually divorce, or U.S. tax and transfer programs become more generous
to families with children than even Germany’s, the economic consequences of divorce in the
United States will remain severe for women and considerably worse than those for men.
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The reason why male and female custody rates add up to over 100% is that people may respond on the
survey that a child is living with them if they have joint custody.
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Table 2.4: Gender Gap by Country: Results and Counterfactual Scenarios
Dependent Variable: ∆EWB Upon Divorce
Counterfactuals
True Data Wage Gap Custody
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.403∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.091∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Australia −0.077 −0.040 −0.010
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Germany −0.080 −0.072 −0.082
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Korea 0.026 0.016 0.079
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Switzerland −0.125∗∗ −0.110∗ −0.044
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
UK −0.174∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗ −0.105∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Female x Australia 0.090 0.001 −0.096
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Female x Germany 0.121∗ 0.093 0.103
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Female x Korea 0.221∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.165∗
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Female x Switzerland 0.129 0.062 −0.051
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Female x UK 0.291∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.142∗
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Constant 0.072∗∗ 0.013 −0.073∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150
R2 0.075 0.039 0.020
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Quantile Regressions (Conditional Median)
Dependent Variable: ∆EWB Upon Divorce
Counterfactuals
True Data Wage Gap Custody
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.346∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.052
(0.049) (0.053) (0.051)
Switzerland −0.038 −0.021 0.033
(0.057) (0.066) (0.060)
UK −0.077∗ −0.084 −0.065
(0.046) (0.052) (0.045)
Korea 0.074 0.054 0.104∗
(0.055) (0.070) (0.062)
Germany −0.050 −0.045 0.017
(0.064) (0.069) (0.055)
Australia −0.090 −0.067 −0.028
(0.056) (0.060) (0.054)
Female x Switzerland 0.006 −0.048 −0.172∗∗
(0.070) (0.077) (0.079)
Female x UK 0.131∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.109∗
(0.064) (0.068) (0.064)
Female x Korea 0.274∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗
(0.108) (0.086) (0.095)
Female x Germany 0.065 0.039 −0.086
(0.082) (0.084) (0.075)
Female x Australia 0.223∗∗∗ 0.143 0.110
(0.085) (0.087) (0.087)
Constant 0.039 −0.010 −0.089∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.040)
Observations 2,150 2,150 2,150
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix A: Results Using Sample Weights
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Table 2.7: Gender Gap by Country: Weighted Results and Counterfactual Scenarios
Dependent Variable: ∆EWB Upon Divorce
Counterfactuals
True Data Wage Gap Custody
(1) (2) (3)
Female −0.394∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Australia −0.088 −0.048 −0.031
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Germany −0.110∗∗ −0.101∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
Korea −0.067 −0.072 −0.038
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
Switzerland −0.121∗ −0.100 −0.042
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
UK −0.277∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Female x Australia 0.141 0.043 −0.009
(0.092) (0.092) (0.091)
Female x Germany 0.162∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077)
Female x Korea 0.239∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
Female x Switzerland 0.113 0.047 −0.030
(0.092) (0.092) (0.091)
Female x UK 0.315∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.183∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084)
Constant 0.095∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.037
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Observations 2,131 2,131 2,131
R2 0.062 0.030 0.018
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix B: Wage Gap Regressions
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Table 2.13: Wage Gap in UK








Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Chapter 3
Maternity Leave for Teen Mothers:
The Impact of Short-Run
Interruptions in Schooling
Introduction
Giving birth to and raising a child while in high school is correlated with a lower probability
of successfully earning a diploma. Motherhood can be both exhausting and time-consuming,
so this relationship could be causal. Determining the magnitude of the causal relationship
and understanding its mechanisms is a challenge. Estimates of the impact of teen births
on economic outcomes that control for observable characteristics show a very large and
robust effect, but once unobserved family characteristics are accounted for, it is far less
clear what the causal impact of teen births on high school graduation is, or the impact on
longer-run economic outcomes (Geronimus and Korenman, 1992). Further undermining the
identification of teen births’ effect on educational outcomes is the fact that teens who give
birth tend to have very high absence rates even prior to becoming pregnant. Students who
105
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give birth may be less engaged in school than those who do not so that the birth itself may
not in fact be the main impediment to accumulating human capital.
Using administrative data from New York City, this paper demonstrates that teen moth-
ers who give birth at the most convenient moment in the academic calendar miss less school,
earn higher standardized test scores, and are more likely to graduate with a diploma than
teens who give birth at less convenient moments. This result suggests that the disruption of
child birth has a causal effect on educational outcomes, independent of the ongoing burden
of having to raise a child. It also suggests that despite the complexity of these teens’ lives
and the many distractions and impediments to learning they may face, each additional day
in school does cause an improvement, albeit a small one, in their outcomes.
The lower educational outcomes of teen mothers can be largely attributed to three factors,
one of which is not causal, and two of which are. As alluded to above, women who give birth
during their teens are more likely to come from lower socioeconomic-status backgrounds and
have lower attendance records prior to giving birth than teens who do not give birth. Teen
births and the likelihood of dropping out of high school would be correlated even if there
were no causal relationship between the two because both are caused by low socioeconomic
status and lower school attendance. Even so, there are two plausible causal mechanisms that
could lead teen pregnancy to harm educational outcomes. The first is the ongoing drain on
one’s time and finances of having a dependent. The cost of diapers, baby food, and other
necessities could make it necessary to find employment, which makes attending school more
difficult. Child care is an ongoing burden that requires money, time, or most likely both. It is
more difficult to study, do homework, and focus on school when one is responsible for a child
that has a fever or is not sleeping. The second reason there may be a causal relationship is
the temporary disruption of giving birth to a newborn child. The period immediately after
giving birth is quite intense and most working women take at least a few weeks off from work
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to recover from child birth and care for their newborn.1 For teens giving birth, this can mean
missing a significant chunk of school that may be difficult to recover from. This disruption in
school attendance could have a significant effect on academic outcomes independent of the
ongoing economic costs of having a child or the characteristics of teenagers that give birth
relative to the ones that do not.
This distinction between the disruption of childbirth and the cost of raising children is
not always appreciated by the literature. For example, Grogger and Bronars (1993) claims
to estimate the impact of an unplanned teen birth by comparing teenage women who gave
birth to twins to teenage women who gave birth to a singleton, and Bronars and Grogger
(1994) uses the same strategy to identify the effects of unplanned motherhood on unmarried
women in general. Even if one accepts their implicit assumption that the cost function
of having children is homogeneous of degree one, the papers both misstate what they are
estimating. They are not estimating the impact of unplanned motherhood, but rather the
ongoing burden of raising an unplanned for child. Their empirical strategy differences out
the impact of giving birth since both the treatment and control groups in their natural
experiment experience that disruption and are forced to miss school or work as a result.
This paper estimates the impact of that temporary disruption that is assumed to not exist
by Grogger and Bronars (1993). Specifically, it estimates the impact of the temporary drop
in school attendance induced by giving birth on educational outcomes independent of the
ongoing burden of having a dependent child or the unobserved characteristics of teen mothers.
I exploit the fact that the disruption to schooling experienced by new teen mothers depends
to a great extent on when during the year the birth occurs. Teens who give birth during
July or August are able to take care of their newborn children for weeks without missing any
1According to an Abt Associates report prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor, 88% of women
surveyed who acknowledged a need for maternal leave reported that they did take leave. Of those taking
leave, 77% took a leave of at least two weeks, despite the fact that only 21% of maternal leave takers reported
receiving paid leave (https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012-Technical-Report.pdf). (Last
accessed July 14, 2017)
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school. Teen pregnancies are mostly unplanned, and therefore students who give birth in
summer months are not likely to be systematically different from those who give birth in the
academic year. Both sets of teen mothers share the unobserved characteristics of teenagers
who give birth, and both sets of teen mothers experience the ongoing burdens of parents
of young children. The main systematic difference between them is that one is essentially
forced by the timing of their childbirth to miss several consecutive weeks of school, while the
other is not.
I will first establish that birth timing is a “natural experiment” by showing that the main
systematic difference between students giving birth in the summer and the school year is
their absence rate. Next I will estimate reduced form results of the impact of birth timing
on standardized tests and graduation rates. Finally, I will use two-stage least squares to
estimate the impact of each absence induced by childbirth on educational outcomes.
“Maternity Leave” vs. Ongoing Burden
One mechanism that may undermine the academic success of teen mothers is the inevitable
multi-week disruption to their schooling from giving birth, which is a mechanism that is
distinct from the ongoing burden of raising a child as a teen mother. This is not to say that
the ongoing burden of raising a child does not matter, as it almost certainly does; rather, the
disruption to schooling from giving birth could matter independent of the burden of raising
a child.
Assume the causal impact of a teen birth on educational success can be modeled in the
following way:
E = m+ c
Where E is the total causal effect of a teen birth on an educational outcome such as high
school graduation or a high school exit exam score, m is the impact of a teen’s “maternity
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leave,” the short-term disruption to schooling caused by child birth and its immediate af-
termath, and c is the ongoing burden of a child: the time and energy required to care for
a child in the months and years following the “maternity leave” period. These costs may
include the difficulty focusing on studying while caring for a child, the need to find a job to
pay for the needs of a child, and the problem of finding consistent child care during school
hours.
Grogger and Bronars (1993) claim to have estimated E by comparing the outcomes of
teenagers who give birth to twins to teenagers who give birth to singletons. In fact, they are
estimating c and implicitly assuming that m is equal to zero. This paper seeks to test the
existence of m, and to measure its magnitude. If m is large, it suggests that schools may
be able to significantly improve the educational outcomes for teen mothers by helping them
re-engage in school and catch up to their peers post “maternity leave.” It also suggests that
Grogger and Bronars (1993) and Bronars and Grogger (1994) may be underestimating the
impact of unplanned motherhood by differencing out the disruption of child birth.
I hypothesize that child birth and recovery causes an increase in absences, and that the
absences induced by child birth leads to lower performance on standardized tests required
for high school graduation and a lower probability of earning a diploma.
New York Regents Examinations
In New York State, students take a series of standardized tests, Regents Examinations, which
cover a variety of subjects and are a requirement to earn a Regents Diploma. In order to
earn a Regents Diploma, students must score 65 or better on five Regents exams, one in each
of the following subjects: Global History, U.S. History, English, Math, and Science. Several
different exams can satisfy the Math and Science subject requirements, but most students
take Algebra for Math and Living Environment for Science.
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Exams are generally taken in June immediately after completing the relevant coursework,
but they can be taken in August and January as well, giving students many other opportu-
nities to take the exams if they need a higher score than what they initially receive or an
exigency, such as giving birth, prevents them from taking an exam in June. The timing of
when students take each exam varies with the student. Students frequently take the Math
exam after completing Algebra 1 in their freshmen year and the English exam at the end of
their junior year, but they may take the exams at different times for various reasons. The
year in which they take Global History, U.S. History, and Science can vary based on which
year they take the relevant courses, but a large majority of students take U.S. History at the
end of their junior year.
For many years, students could graduate with a Local Diploma which required lower
scores on the exams than the Regents Diploma. Starting with the cohort of students who
entered 9th grade in 2008, New York state high schools stopped offering the Local Diploma,
except for a small group of special education students, and earning a Regents Diploma be-
came a requirement to graduate from high school. Earlier cohorts of students could still earn
Local Diplomas, but the state phased it out by gradually increasing test score requirements
each year until the requirements for earning a Local Diploma converged on the requirements
of earning a Regents Diploma and the Local Diploma was dropped for non-special education
students.
The data cover cohorts prior to and after the elimination of the Local Diploma, so many
students in our data graduate from high school with a Local Diploma, while many others
graduate with a Regents Diploma.
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Data
Data are drawn from educational records from the New York City Department of Education
(DOE) and birth records from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Office of Vital Statitstics (DOHMH-OVS). The education data observe all middle school
and high school students in the public education system from 2005 to 2013. It has data
on monthly student attendance, Regents Exam scores, and discharge codes indicating the
reason a student left a school (Local Diploma, Regents Diploma, drop out, transfer, etc.).
The purpose of this paper is to study how teen births affect eventual high school outcomes.
Toward that end, we exclude teen births that occur in the last three years of our sample
(2011, 2012, and 2013), in order to focus on the students whom we can observe through their
scheduled year of graduation. The sample is further restricted to women who have given
birth during their freshman or sophomore year and are under the age of 18. The analysis
focuses on these students because they are early enough in their high school careers that
they still have Regents Exams to take in the future. A student giving birth the summer after
her junior year would already have taken all of the Regents Exams required for a Regents
Diploma. Most students take the bulk of their Regents Exams as sophomores or juniors, and
the vast majority take English and U.S. History for the first time at the end of their junior
year.
Table 3.1 summarizes the sample. Approximately 20% gave birth in the summer, which
I define as July and August. The remaining giving birth during the academic year, which I
define as September through June. The absence rate varies considerably, but the average rate
of absence is extremely high with 90 absences per year. Almost 60% of the sample sample
are Latino, 36% are black, and the remaining students are other races. Very few students in
the sample earn a high school diploma of any kind, and even fewer earn a Regents Diploma.
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Empirical Strategy
Limiting the sample to students who gave birth under the age of 18 eliminates concerns over
whether the unobserved characteristics of teen mothers bias our results. The key comparison
of this study is between teen mothers who give birth during the academic year versus those
who conveniently give birth during summer vacation.
A critical assumption for the identification strategy is that there are no systematic unob-
served differences between teenagers who give birth during the summer and teenagers who
give birth during the academic year. On its face, this assumption seems plausible. Teen
births are typically not the result of a carefully timed decision not to use birth control. It
is implausible that any significant subset of students time their birth control use or sex-
ual activity in order to give birth at the most convenient time of the academic calendar.
Buckles and Hungerman (2013) do find that births in the general population are not evenly
distributed throughout the year, with a disproportionate share of births to teenagers and
low-socioeconomic status women occurring during the winter, but this seasonality appears
to be driven by the planned births of older and higher socioeconomic status women. Women
trying to have children are more likely to attempt to conceive at some times of year than
others. Among “unwanted births,” Buckles and Hungerman do not find any seasonality.
Levin et al. (2002) find that debut sexual activity is higher in May, June, July and
December. This suggests that there could potentially be seasonality in when relatively
sexually inexperienced teenagers (within our sample of teen mothers) give birth, although it
is worth noting that teen sexual activity is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for
a teen birth nine months later. If this seasonality in debut sexual activity were to lead to
seasonality in teen births, it most likely would be the case that the least sexually experienced
teen mothers would be giving birth during the academic year. October and November, the
months of conception that would lead to births in July or August are below average months
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for debut sexual activity according to the results in Levin et al. (2002). This potential
relationship is highly speculative and does not seem like a major threat to identification.
Table 3.2 tests for systematic differences between students giving birth in the summer and
those giving birth during the academic year by regressing observable student characteristics
on a summer birth dummy variable. Aside from the expected relationship with absences,
the only statistically significant effect is on the likelihood of living in a high or very high
poverty neighborhood and the age at birth. The relationship with neighborhood poverty
is marginally statistically significant with a t-statistic of 1.74, and given the number of
comparisons being tested, the probability of finding one statistically significant comparison
at the 10% level by random chance is over 40%. The effect on age at birth is expected given
that our sample is restricted by grade. Students giving birth in the summer after sophomore
year will on average be older than students giving birth during sophomore year. While this
indicates the importance of controlling for age at the time of birth, this does not necessarily
indicate that there will be systematic unobserved differences between the students giving
birth in the summer and those giving birth during the academic year.
One potential threat to identification is students’ choices about whether to terminate a
pregnancy. There could potentially be some students who would not terminate a pregnancy
if their due date was in the summer, but not terminate the pregnancy if the due date
was during the academic year. Our data do not observe terminated pregnancies, so this is
impossible to test, but it is worth noting that this requires significant foresight on the part
of these teenagers. Termination decisions are made during the first trimester, so they would
have to be thinking specifically about their academic schedule in six months in order to
let the academic calendar determine their choice to terminate or not. This seems unlikely.
If anything, I would expect students to make the decision about whether to terminate a
pregnancy or not based on what is going on in their life during the first trimester, not what
they expect to be happening six months later. Students giving birth in the summer will have
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their first trimester in the late fall.
Attendance Advantage of Summer Births
We must first establish that there is in fact an effect of giving birth on school absences,
and that it is smaller for students who give birth during the summer months. Figure 3.1
compares the pattern of absences for students giving birth in July, to students giving birth
in the academic year. For both groups, the absence rate is very high, but for students
giving birth in the academic year, the highest rate of absences is in the month the birth
occurs, closely followed by the month immediately following it. Students giving birth in July
do not have absence rates in those months because school is not in session. This suggests
that giving birth in the summer does in fact produce a stark difference in the number of
student absences. Figure 3.2 shows the same pattern of absences for academic year births,
but compares them to the absence pattern for students giving birth in August. The students
giving birth in August also miss out on having an absence rate in the month of giving birth
as well as the month prior to it.
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the annual difference in absence rates between students giving
birth during the school year, and those giving birth during the summer months. I mea-
sure absences by summing up the total absences from the 12 month period beginning two
months prior to the month of birth and ending nine months after it, which ensures that each
student’s total absences is based on data from every month in the year. While there is a
wide range in total absences within each group, Figure 3.3 clearly demonstrates that the
absence distribution is shifted lower for students who give birth in the summer. Figure 3.4
also shows this difference between the summer birth distribution of absences and the school
year distribution.
Table 3.3 shows that giving birth in the summer results in approximately 15 fewer ab-
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sences, with minor variations depending on the covariates. This is equivalent to three full
weeks of missed school.
Results
Reduced-form Impact on High School Outcomes
Tables 3.4-3.6 show the reduced form impact of giving birth in the summer on the likelihood of
dropping out, graduating, and graduating with a Regents Diploma using a linear probability
model. Each table shows estimates of the effect of a summer birth using three different
specifications, each of which has a different set of controls. The preferred specification is the
third column in each table:
Outcomei =β0 + β1Summer Birthi + β2Age at Birthi + β3Grade at Birthi+
+ β4ELLi + β5FRLi + β6Blacki + β7Latinoi+
Neighborhood Povertyi + Cohorti + εi (3.1)
where ELL is an English Language Learner dummy, FRL is Free- and Reduced-price Lunch
eligibility, and Neighborhood Poverty corresponds to a series of dummy variables indicating
the level of poverty of the student’s neighborhood, with the lowest level of neighborhood
poverty as the omitted category. Finally, the Cohort variable is a series of dummy variables
controlling for the year in which a given student entered high school.
Table 3.4 shows that giving birth in the summer produces a 5.9 percentage point drop
in the likelihood of a student dropping out. The estimated effect of a summer birth on the
likelihood of graduating, a 5.4 percentage point increase, is shown in Table 3.5, and as one
would expect, it is roughly the same magnitude and in the opposite direction as the effect on
dropping out. The likelihood of earning a Regents Diploma is increased by 3.7 percentage
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points, and is shown in Table 3.6. This represents a fairly large increase in the probability of
earning a Regents Diploma, considering only 8.9% of the sample earns one (see Table 3.1).
Reduced-form Impact on Regents Exam Results
Regents exams are taken by different students at different times, and if a student fails an
exam initially they can potentially re-take an exam multiple times. Whether an exam is
taken before or after a student’s pregnancy is endogenous, so estimating the impact of a
birth on exams taken after the birth takes place is problematic.
To avoid this problem, I will simply examine the maximum score that a given student
achieved in each subject. If one student takes the math regents exam in 9th grade and
receives a 70, and another student receives a 60 in 9th grade, retakes it and receives a 63
in 10th grade, and a 70 in 11th, both students would have the same maximum score. Aside
from avoiding the endogeneity of when students choose to take exams, using maximum
scores makes conceptual sense. Whether or not a student is able to graduate with a Regents
Diploma is determined by a students’ maximum score in each subject; the second best score
on an exam is irrelevant. The obvious disadvantage of using maximum scores is that students
may potentially have earned their maximum score in a given subject before they even became
pregnant.
The unit of observation is the student, and I run separate regressions for each subject.
The specification is similar to Equation 3.1:
Maximum z-Scorei =β0 + β1Summer Birthi + β2Age at Birthi + β3Grade at Birthi+
+ β4ELLi + β5FRLi + β6Blacki + β7Latinoi+
Neighborhood Povertyi + Cohorti + εi (3.2)
where i specifies an individual student. The key coefficient of interest is β1, and it is estimated
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in the first row of Table 3.7. I also estimate the likelihood of passing a Regents Exam in each
subject using linear probability models with the exact same specification as Equation 3.2
except the dependent variable is passing a Regents subject instead of the maximum z-Score.
The results of those linear probability models are in Table 3.8.
Across all five subject areas, giving birth in the summer rather than the academic year
produces an increase in average test scores of approximately one tenth of a standard devia-
tion. It produces approximately a five percentage point increase in the likelihood of passing
each subject. In both tables, the variation in effects between subjects is too small to be
statistically significant, but the effect on the likelihood of passing English is not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. All other subjects have effects that are statistically
significant.
Structural Equation Impact of Absences on Student Outcomes
One hopes that attending school leads to better academic outcomes, but the causal impact
of absences on academic outcomes is difficult to estimate. An observational study regressing
academic outcomes on number of absences would most likely overestimate the importance of
attendance since it is probably correlated with a number of unobserved characteristics that
affect academic performance. For example, students who are chronically absent from school
are probably on average less focused on the days that they do attend. Giving birth during
the academic year will result in a spike in absences for even the most conscientious and
focused student, therefore it can be considered an exogenous shock to a student’s absence
rate. We can exploit the exogeneity of birth timing to instrument for absences and estimate
the magnitude of their causal effect on academic outcomes. The first stage equation uses the
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following specification:
Absencesi =β0 + β1Summer Birthi + β2Age at Birthi + β3Grade at Birthi+
+ β4ELLi + β5FRLi + β6Blacki + β7Latinoi+
Neighborhood Povertyi + Cohorti + εi (3.3)
The F -statistic for the excluded instrument, Summer Birth, is 70, substantially above the
“rule-of-thumb” cutoff of 10 for weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The structural
equation for each outcome is the following:
Outcomei =β0 + β1 ̂Absencesi + β2Age at Birthi + β3Grade at Birthi+
+ β3ELLi + β4FRLi + β5Blacki + β6Latinoi+
Neighborhood Povertyi + Cohorti + εi (3.4)
The IV results for graduation outcomes are shown in Table 3.9. Each additional absence
reduces the probability of graduating by .4 percentage points and graduating with a Regents
Diploma by .2 percentage points. These effects are small, but they are not zero. It would
be unlikely for a single absence to make or break a student’s high school outcome. These
estimates imply that if an exogenous shock increased 100 teen mothers’ annual attendance
by two weeks (ten school days), four of them would graduate instead of dropping out as a
result.
The IV results for Regents Exam outcomes are in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. There is varia-
tion across different subjects, but the results suggest each additional absence reduces Regents
Exam scores in each subject by approximately 1/100th of a standard deviation and reduces
the probability of passing by approximately .5%. Just like the reduced-form results, some
subjects appear to be more sensitive to absences than others, but the differences between
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them are not statistically significant so it would be a mistake to over-interpret those dif-
ferences. These results indicate that two weeks of additional absences raise exam scores by
one tenth of a standard deviation and increase the probability of passing by four percentage
points.
It is worth noting that, assuming that it is a valid instrument, the estimates produced by
using birth timing as an instrument for absences will be a Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE), specifically the effect of absences on academic outcomes for New York City high
school students who give birth in their freshman or sophomore year. This is a population of
students who already have very high absence rates and are most likely not attending one of
the city’s top performing high schools. In other words, this LATE is unlikely to be a good
estimate for the effect of absences on academic outcomes for the student population as a
whole (the Average Treatment Effect, or ATE).
These estimates are most relevant to students who are missing a lot of school. Given that
many of these students may be highly disengaged from school, it is not a foregone conclusion
that an exogenous shock to absences would affect academic outcomes. These results suggest
that despite complicated lives that make focusing on school difficult, each additional day in
the classroom does tangibly improve these students’ outcomes.
Conclusion
This paper establishes the existence of a previously un-examined mechanism in the causal
impact of teen motherhood on educational outcomes. The effect of the short-term disruption
to one’s schooling, not just the ongoing burden of being a teen mother, has not been artic-
ulated by prior studies of the causal effects of teen motherhood, and Grogger and Bronars
(1993) implicitly assumes that it does not exist.
I find that the short-term disruption to school attendance induced by giving birth has a
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lasting effect on students’ performance on high school exit exams and likelihood of gradu-
ating. By comparing students who give birth during summer vacation, when students can
enjoy a non-disruptive “maternity leave” from school, to students who give birth during
the academic year, when school is in session and giving birth inevitably leads to missing
school, the paper isolates the causal effect of the short-term disruption. Giving birth in
the summer reduces annual absences by approximately 15 school days; that additional time
in the classroom increases the probability of passing the Regents Exam in each subject by
approximately 5 percentage points, and the likelihood of graduating with a Regents Diploma
by 3.7 percentage points.
These results demonstrate that one of the mechanisms that determines the causal effect
of teen motherhood on academic outcomes is the short-term disruption to schooling induced
by child birth and its immediate aftermath. It also implies that raising attendance rates on
the margin can improve academic outcomes even for students who have complicated lives
and are chronically absent.
The disruptive impact of child birth, independent of the burden of child rearing, may be
relevant to women at other points in the lifecycle, for example women who give birth during
college or graduate school. It may also have an effect on women who are in the workforce.
Future research could potentially explore these questions.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Summer Birth 4,171 0.201 0.401 0 1
Absences 4,171 90.398 43.686 0 190
Age at Birth 4,171 16.740 0.812 13.996 17.999
ELL 4,171 0.132 0.339 0 1
Black 4,171 0.369 0.483 0 1
Latino 4,171 0.592 0.492 0 1
Grade Level at Birth 4,171 9.436 0.496 9 10
Graduate 4,171 0.178 0.383 0 1
Regents Graduate 4,171 0.089 0.285 0 1
Free Lunch 4,171 0.810 0.393 0 1




























































































































































































































































































































Summer Birth −13.984∗∗∗ −15.430∗∗∗ −15.219∗∗∗
(1.674) (1.640) (1.637)
Age at Birth 6.603∗∗∗ 6.352∗∗∗
(0.894) (0.895)
Grade at Birth −20.150∗∗∗ −20.136∗∗∗
(1.373) (1.371)








Medium Poverty Neighb. −0.725
(3.295)
High Poverty Neighb. −0.209
(3.228)
Very High Poverty Neighb. 2.572
(3.190)
Constant 93.211∗∗∗ 186.034∗∗∗ 189.105∗∗∗
(0.751) (18.621) (19.056)
Cohort Dummies N Y Y
Observations 4,171 4,171 4,171
R2 0.016 0.073 0.080
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Summer Birth −0.036∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Age at Birth 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Grade at Birth −0.206∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)








Medium Poverty Neighb. −0.035
(0.036)
High Poverty Neighb. −0.032
(0.035)
Very High Poverty Neighb. −0.012
(0.035)
Constant 0.641∗∗∗ 0.327 0.325
(0.008) (0.204) (0.209)
Cohort Dummies N Y Y
Observations 4,171 4,171 4,171
R2 0.001 0.087 0.090
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Summer Birth 0.037∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Age at Birth −0.112∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Grade at Birth 0.241∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)








Medium Poverty Neighb. −0.031
(0.028)
High Poverty Neighb. −0.025
(0.028)
Very High Poverty Neighb. −0.040
(0.027)
Constant 0.171∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗ −0.350∗∗
(0.007) (0.159) (0.163)
Cohort Dummies N Y Y
Observations 4,171 4,171 4,171
R2 0.001 0.120 0.123
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Summer Birth 0.023∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age at Birth −0.077∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Grade at Birth 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)








Medium Poverty Neighb. 0.001
(0.021)
High Poverty Neighb. 0.010
(0.021)
Very High Poverty Neighb. −0.008
(0.021)
Constant 0.084∗∗∗ 0.171 0.151
(0.005) (0.121) (0.124)
Cohort Dummies N Y Y
Observations 4,171 4,171 4,171
R2 0.001 0.082 0.088
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Summer Birth 0.093∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.053) (0.049) (0.056) (0.046) (0.049)
Age at Birth −0.244∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028)
Grade at Birth 0.387∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.053) (0.043) (0.046)
English Language −0.516∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗
Learner (0.070) (0.062) (0.070) (0.057) (0.061)
Free Lunch 0.118∗ 0.023 0.047 −0.007 −0.016
(0.061) (0.055) (0.065) (0.052) (0.057)
Black −0.362∗∗∗ −0.198∗ −0.179 −0.044 −0.064
(0.126) (0.110) (0.133) (0.105) (0.109)
Latino −0.258∗∗ −0.095 −0.077 0.079 0.078
(0.125) (0.109) (0.133) (0.105) (0.109)
Medium Poverty −0.125 −0.021 −0.091 −0.083 −0.159
Neighborhood (0.110) (0.102) (0.114) (0.094) (0.102)
High Poverty −0.130 −0.061 −0.121 −0.094 −0.133
Neighborhood (0.108) (0.100) (0.111) (0.092) (0.100)
Very High Poverty −0.321∗∗∗ −0.114 −0.324∗∗∗ −0.124 −0.257∗∗∗
Neighborhood (0.106) (0.099) (0.109) (0.091) (0.098)
Constant 0.544 1.008 0.609 −0.751 0.069
(0.678) (0.625) (0.671) (0.542) (0.596)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,510 1,612 1,176 1,877 1,521
R2 0.114 0.097 0.095 0.079 0.114
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Summer Birth 0.027 0.056∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.052∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.027) (0.029)
Age at Birth −0.107∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016)
Grade at Birth 0.197∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024) (0.026)
English Language −0.229∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
Learner (0.038) (0.035) (0.043) (0.033) (0.036)
Free Lunch 0.024 −0.0001 0.009 0.018 −0.038
(0.033) (0.031) (0.039) (0.030) (0.033)
Black −0.156∗∗ −0.107∗ −0.083 0.025 −0.023
(0.067) (0.061) (0.081) (0.060) (0.064)
Latino −0.085 −0.037 −0.038 0.100∗ 0.024
(0.067) (0.061) (0.080) (0.060) (0.063)
Medium Poverty −0.070 0.011 0.046 −0.021 −0.070
Neighborhood (0.059) (0.057) (0.068) (0.054) (0.059)
High Poverty −0.053 −0.018 0.038 −0.026 −0.039
Neighborhood (0.058) (0.056) (0.067) (0.053) (0.058)
Very High Poverty −0.106∗ −0.058 −0.048 −0.033 −0.111∗
Neighborhood (0.058) (0.056) (0.066) (0.053) (0.057)
Constant 0.766∗∗ 0.759∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 0.171 0.657∗
(0.370) (0.352) (0.411) (0.312) (0.344)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,560 1,701 1,232 1,984 1,642
R2 0.091 0.092 0.080 0.091 0.118
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: IV Regression Results: Graduation Outcomes
Dependent variable:
Dropout Graduate Regents Graduate
(1) (2) (3)
Absences 0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age at Birth 0.124∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Grade at Birth −0.128∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.016)
English Language Learner 0.039∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.017) (0.014)
Free Lunch 0.019 0.010 −0.009
(0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
Black 0.039 0.012 0.006
(0.037) (0.029) (0.023)
Latino −0.002 0.034 0.033
(0.037) (0.028) (0.022)
Medium Poverty Neighb. −0.032 −0.034 −0.001
(0.035) (0.026) (0.021)
High Poverty Neighb. −0.031 −0.026 0.010
(0.034) (0.026) (0.021)
Very High Poverty Neighb. −0.022 −0.031 −0.002
(0.034) (0.026) (0.020)
Constant −0.414 0.324 0.616∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.228) (0.180)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 4,171 4,171 4,171
R2 0.161 0.226 0.124
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Absences −0.008∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Age at Birth −0.172∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.102∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.119∗
(0.048) (0.043) (0.058) (0.048) (0.066)
Grade at Birth 0.312∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.052) (0.078) (0.062) (0.064)
English Language −0.573∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗
Learner (0.076) (0.062) (0.078) (0.062) (0.083)
Free Lunch 0.073 0.016 −0.064 −0.056 −0.093
(0.066) (0.053) (0.084) (0.056) (0.071)
Black −0.319∗∗ −0.221∗∗ −0.152 −0.001 −0.026
(0.126) (0.107) (0.137) (0.105) (0.114)
Latino −0.228∗ −0.129 −0.052 0.112 0.099
(0.124) (0.107) (0.137) (0.104) (0.113)
Medium Poverty −0.146 −0.037 −0.110 −0.087 −0.154
Neighborhood (0.109) (0.099) (0.117) (0.092) (0.105)
High Poverty −0.131 −0.065 −0.112 −0.078 −0.111
Neighborhood (0.106) (0.097) (0.113) (0.090) (0.104)
Very High Poverty −0.301∗∗∗ −0.118 −0.252∗∗ −0.098 −0.184∗
Neighborhood (0.106) (0.096) (0.117) (0.090) (0.108)
Constant 0.574 0.840 0.658 −0.461 −0.195
(0.667) (0.607) (0.689) (0.549) (0.624)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,510 1,612 1,176 1,877 1,521
R2 0.141 0.157 0.049 0.122 0.056
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Absences −0.002 −0.004∗∗ −0.006∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age at Birth −0.087∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.085∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036)
Grade at Birth 0.174∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.051) (0.039) (0.043)
English Language −0.244∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗
Learner (0.040) (0.035) (0.050) (0.036) (0.047)
Free Lunch 0.013 −0.007 −0.039 −0.012 −0.063∗
(0.034) (0.030) (0.047) (0.032) (0.036)
Black −0.147∗∗ −0.116∗ −0.052 0.049 0.007
(0.066) (0.061) (0.083) (0.061) (0.066)
Latino −0.079 −0.051 −0.006 0.116∗ 0.048
(0.066) (0.061) (0.083) (0.061) (0.065)
Medium Poverty −0.078 −0.002 0.036 −0.026 −0.071
Neighborhood (0.059) (0.057) (0.070) (0.055) (0.060)
High Poverty −0.056 −0.022 0.031 −0.019 −0.036
Neighborhood (0.057) (0.056) (0.068) (0.054) (0.059)
Very High Poverty −0.103∗ −0.057 −0.019 −0.013 −0.088
Neighborhood (0.056) (0.055) (0.068) (0.054) (0.060)
Constant 0.802∗∗ 0.710∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.505 0.715∗∗
(0.362) (0.347) (0.421) (0.340) (0.351)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,560 1,701 1,232 1,984 1,642
R2 0.138 0.121 0.054 0.066 0.097
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.12: Logistic Regression
Dependent variable:
Dropout Graduate Regents Graduation
(1) (2) (3)
Summer Birth −0.286∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.106) (0.139)
Age at Birth 0.698∗∗∗ −0.897∗∗∗ −1.036∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.063) (0.082)
Grade at Birth −0.970∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.103) (0.137)
English Language Learner 0.079 −0.270∗ −0.732∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.139) (0.199)
Free Lunch −0.018 0.284∗∗ 0.140
(0.088) (0.121) (0.162)
Black 0.298∗ −0.140 −0.220
(0.179) (0.245) (0.342)
Latino 0.062 0.086 0.217
(0.178) (0.243) (0.336)
Medium Poverty Neighb. −0.169 −0.229 0.024
(0.172) (0.212) (0.296)
High Poverty Neighb. −0.158 −0.192 0.119
(0.169) (0.207) (0.288)
Very High Poverty Neighb. −0.064 −0.305 −0.135
(0.167) (0.205) (0.288)
Constant −0.395 −6.120∗∗∗ −3.383∗∗
(1.004) (1.275) (1.643)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 4,171 4,171 4,171
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Summer Birth 0.118 0.259∗∗ 0.289∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.235∗
(0.133) (0.127) (0.148) (0.116) (0.128)
Age at Birth −0.495∗∗∗ −0.575∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗ −0.662∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.067) (0.075)
Grade at Birth 0.904∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.127) (0.143) (0.110) (0.124)
English Language −1.021∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗ −0.443∗∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗
Learner (0.173) (0.164) (0.187) (0.144) (0.165)
Free Lunch 0.108 0.004 0.042 0.080 −0.176
(0.153) (0.142) (0.169) (0.131) (0.147)
Black −0.729∗∗ −0.493∗ −0.356 0.109 −0.099
(0.328) (0.276) (0.353) (0.265) (0.288)
Latino −0.400 −0.169 −0.161 0.438∗ 0.112
(0.328) (0.274) (0.352) (0.265) (0.286)
Medium Poverty −0.347 0.043 0.202 −0.096 −0.328
Neighborhood (0.287) (0.260) (0.297) (0.237) (0.267)
High Poverty −0.265 −0.090 0.171 −0.121 −0.185
Neighborhood (0.283) (0.257) (0.290) (0.232) (0.263)
Very High Poverty −0.503∗ −0.282 −0.204 −0.145 −0.511∗∗
Neighborhood (0.279) (0.255) (0.286) (0.230) (0.260)
Constant 1.428 0.922 2.588 −1.543 0.579
(1.821) (1.604) (1.800) (1.368) (1.541)
Cohort Dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,560 1,701 1,232 1,984 1,642
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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